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RE: [jboske] Opacity and belief

> And Rosta scripsit:
> > > If gorse and furze are synonyms
> > > for John, then John can't possibly believe that gorse is not furze, unless
> > > he is a Tortoise
> >
> > Yes, but I'm not sure what your point is!
> You were saying that "John believes that furze is not gorse" uses
> "furze" and/or
> "gorse" in a non-standard sense. But this is not necessary, given that
> belief that-clauses are inherently de dicto

I believe there is a distinction between

John said furze is not gorse.
John said "Furze is not gorse".

in the former, I describe John's dicta/beliefs using my words. In the
latter, I report his words/beliefs using his words. I take de dicto
to be the former.

> > If you're right, then I think we need to separate de re into pure de re,
> > where everything is exportable out of the subordinate proposition
> > from dedictoey de re, where nothing is exportable out of the subordinate
> > proposition, but the description of the subordinate proposition is
> > language-independent
> Well, I understand your distinction, but your terminology is rebarbative:
> the whole point about de re ("concerning the thing") beliefs is that
> they are beliefs *about* some object *that* some predicate applies to it
> Exporting, or rather not importing in the first place, is of the essence

I'll switch terminology if you suggest some. The problem seems to be
in our conception of what de dicto is.

> > There is no problem with reporting this in Lojban. We just need one
> > predicate that denotes what Pierre's 'Londres' denotes and another
> > predicate that denotes what his 'London' denotes
> I don't think that such predicates can exist. Pierre's London is a real
> place, but his Londres is a projection of a concept that doesn't refer

How come? I don't see them as having a different status. Both Pierrean
London and Pierrean Londres are concepts/categories/kinds. Whether
things in the real world actually instantiate them is neither here nor

> > That's right. But from someone's belief that A is B, you can't infer
> > that they believe the words A' and B' to be synonymous, since the
> > latter belief requires the supporting belief that the synonymy is
> > part of the body of language beliefs believed by other competent
> > speakers
> Fair enough

Sorry for having taken so many messages to succeed in formulating
my thought in a manner you can assent to!