From jcowan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxxx Mon Dec 13 07:22:49 1999 X-Digest-Num: 310 Message-ID: <44114.310.1707.959273825@eGroups.com> Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 10:22:49 -0500 From: John Cowan > From: Pycyn@aol.com > > << I think at one point that we decided that intentional descriptions and > names are from the point of view of the speaker (bearing in mind the > listener), so that if I use "la djan" in a sentence, the only thing that > matters is whether I and the listener know who John is, not whether le > djuno uses that name (or description) as part of lenu le djuno cu djuno.>> > > I wonder if we could have decided that and then could make it stick for lo se > djuno. In a lot of cases, it is clearly important what concept/name is > involved in the clause: John knows that the number of planets is larger than > seven has to be about the number of planets, not some other name of nine But this is not a name in the sense meant above; it is a veridical description of nine, not a name of nine. I can say "John knows that George is greater than seven" if by "George" I mean "the number of planets" (quotes are mandatory here). > (especially since John may not know it is nine) . If John thinks that the > number of planets is eleven and knows that the number of players on a > football team (which he has right) is larger than seven, that will not count > as his knowing that the number of planets is larger than seven. I agree with this. > Similarly, > if John knows Paul under some wrongheaded description but knows that the > person he knows under that description went to the party, that may well count > for knowing that Paul went to the party. This sounds like Bernard J. Ortcutt again. -- Schlingt dreifach einen Kreis vom dies! || John Cowan Schliesst euer Aug vor heiliger Schau, || http://www.reutershealth.com Denn er genoss vom Honig-Tau, || http://www.ccil.org/~cowan Und trank die Milch vom Paradies. -- Coleridge (tr. Politzer)