Received: from mail-wy0-f189.google.com ([74.125.82.189]:56916) by stodi.digitalkingdom.org with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1R8JiB-0000ds-4s; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:51 -0700 Received: by wyh11 with SMTP id 11sf9934494wyh.16 for ; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:35 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlegroups.com; s=beta; h=x-beenthere:received-spf:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:x-original-sender :x-original-authentication-results:reply-to:precedence:mailing-list :list-id:x-google-group-id:list-post:list-help:list-archive:sender :list-subscribe:list-unsubscribe:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=FSXA5Ebp128LrOJXcOp6Q2dTuM43k8ZXWyyjG+sAxUM=; b=wbkazdAiD2OCyNJpXP08+esxWajNn85QeGa//zLA4qOmCBcn9s0gQbd5kEWDQswXY4 3zPAt5ntYke4kb9rIlYYK5CW2aa1jeMQFUpp6sfa6t8HECtDHLfNOKEJurykC8mpIVlw kJLdiePyCeT1prdkxcipAp2h4zs9JSCzhCrEk= Received: by 10.216.230.159 with SMTP id j31mr601356weq.6.1317076294267; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:34 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: lojban@googlegroups.com Received: by 10.14.3.10 with SMTP id 10ls763444eeg.2.canary; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.213.9.79 with SMTP id k15mr1161820ebk.3.1317076292892; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.213.9.79 with SMTP id k15mr1161818ebk.3.1317076292865; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-fx0-f53.google.com (mail-fx0-f53.google.com [209.85.161.53]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id g11si99264fag.1.2011.09.26.15.31.32 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:32 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of jjllambias@gmail.com designates 209.85.161.53 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.161.53; Received: by mail-fx0-f53.google.com with SMTP id 2so7265021fxh.40 for ; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:32 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.223.101.2 with SMTP id a2mr7104353fao.2.1317076292688; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.152.39.35 with HTTP; Mon, 26 Sep 2011 15:31:32 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20110925153046.GB4576@gonzales> References: <20110919013653.GC6878@gonzales> <1316535587.5338.YahooMailRC@web81305.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20110921000757.GR4310@gonzales> <1316618218.15694.YahooMailRC@web81304.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20110922234555.GB24443@gonzales> <1316736086.52889.YahooMailRC@web81307.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20110924150246.GA4576@gonzales> <20110925153046.GB4576@gonzales> Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2011 19:31:32 -0300 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Jorge_Llamb=EDas?= To: lojban@googlegroups.com X-Original-Sender: jjllambias@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of jjllambias@gmail.com designates 209.85.161.53 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=jjllambias@gmail.com; dkim=pass (test mode) header.i=@gmail.com Reply-To: lojban@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list lojban@googlegroups.com; contact lojban+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 1004133512417 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: Sender: lojban@googlegroups.com List-Subscribe: , List-Unsubscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) X-Spam_score: 0.0 X-Spam_score_int: 0 X-Spam_bar: / On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 12:30 PM, Martin Bays wrote: > > Would you even agree that, in the case that we have a predication > P(k1,k2) about kinds k1, k2 (which is already in your Nirvana form) > which correspond to properties Q1(X), Q2(X), > and if the predication resolves existentially in all variables, then it > resolves as in the subject line of this thread, i.e. to > =A0 =A0EX (X1,X2). (C(X1,X2) /\ P(X1,X2)) > where C is a context-glorked relation which depends on any quantifiers > (including ones over worlds) which the current predication is in the > scope of, and which is such that C(X1,X2) implies Q1(X1)/\Q2(X2)? > > (X, X1, X2 all plural mundane variables, i.e. not allowed to take kinds, > but not restricted to atoms) That would seem to be the definition of "resolves existentially", right? If you can find a new model in which what you expressed in terms of kinds can be reexpressed in terms of an existential quantification over the manifestations of the kinds, then we say that the predication about kinds in the original model "resolves existentially" in the new model. >> Where we seem to desagree is in thinking that this "resolution" is >> somehow a necessary step in the interpretation of the original >> predication. You seem to be saying that a domain of discourse that >> includes a kind but not its instances is somehow defective. > > Yes, I think so. "lions are in my garden" and "one or more lions are in > my garden" are equivalent - one is true iff the other is. Our formalism > should reflect that. So a model in which it holds of the kind Lion that > =A0 =A0in(Lion, my garden) > it should also hold that > =A0 =A0EX l. (lion(l) /\ in(l, my garden)) > , and vice-versa. No, because you don't have lion instances in the first model, so the second one doesn't hold in that model. You have a different model for each of the sentences that are truth value equivalent. >> (But at the same time you have >> no objection to domains that include an individual but not its stages, >> although there are analogous types of predications about individuals >> that can be resolved as existential quantification over stages. > > I think they resolve as existential quantification over worlds; does this > agree with what you mean by 'stage'? No, that's the interpretation that corresponds to the one with kinds. In the stages model, time is not an index over worlds, but it is only a dimension of one world (like space). In the one world, instead of a single individual that shows up again and again in many of the worlds indexed by t, we have a lot of stages, one for each time of the same world. So instead of quantifying over worlds, you quantify over stages. The analogy is that in the case of kinds, you have many worlds (each of which indexed not just by t, but by a spatial location as well) and a single in dividual that shows up again and again in many of the worlds indexed by space-time. If instead you have a single world with many places, then you have a different manifestation of the kind at every place, instead of the kind showing up here and there. (That's an oversimplification, because kinds don't just show up in spatiotemporally indexed worlds, but in all sorts of other worlds too. But the space to time analogy is useful.) > "John is sometimes wise" holds at every time iff "John is wise" holds at > some time. Rather "John sat there" is true if, in the one world that extends throughout time just as it extends throughout space, there is a stage of John j such that sits(j, there) holds. > Since there's no new object like a kind involved, there's no need for > any new axioms which acceptable models must satisfy. The object analogous to the kind is none other than John himself. The stages of John, dispersed along the time dimension, are analogous to the manifestations of the kind, dispersed througout space. > If we made "sometimes wise" into a single predicate "sometimes-wise", > then we would want to make it an axiom that it agrees with "sometimes > wise"; that's vaguely analogous to the case of kinds. Is that the kind > of thing you mean? Kind of. I'm comparing a predicate that may apply to some of the time-stages of John but not necessarily to all, with a predicate that may apply to some of the space-manifestations of a kind, but not necessarily to all. mu'o mi'e xorxes --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= lojban" group. To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegrou= ps.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban= ?hl=3Den.