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[87.194.76.177]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id fr4sm13082491wbb.0.2011.10.24.16.05.00 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Mon, 24 Oct 2011 16:05:03 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <4EA5EF1A.9060501@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2011 00:04:58 +0100 From: And Rosta User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23) Gecko/20110920 Thunderbird/3.1.15 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: lojban@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable References: <20111013043308.GD3367@gonzales> <4E981179.1030805@gmail.com> <20111014225934.GC3111@gonzales> <4E98D899.7080608@gmail.com> <20111015200404.GB3090@gonzales> <4E9A39C9.3010605@gmail.com> <20111016050503.GA21114@gonzales> <4E9B77B1.2050608@gmail.com> <20111018032657.GO21114@gonzales> <4E9E4B3E.2080001@gmail.com> <20111019051100.GA24975@gonzales> <4E9F32CB.4010102@gmail.com> <1319077342.88005.YahooMailRC@web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> In-Reply-To: <1319077342.88005.YahooMailRC@web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> X-Original-Sender: and.rosta@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of and.rosta@gmail.com designates 74.125.82.41 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=and.rosta@gmail.com; dkim=pass (test mode) header.i=@gmail.com Reply-To: lojban@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list lojban@googlegroups.com; contact lojban+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 1004133512417 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: Sender: lojban@googlegroups.com List-Subscribe: , List-Unsubscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) X-Spam_score: -0.7 X-Spam_score_int: -6 X-Spam_bar: / John E Clifford, On 20/10/2011 03:22: > Odd notion of ambiguity which doesn't occur but still presents a sentence which > is both true and false. What's odd? You don't think there's such a thing as an unambiguous sentence that can be true or false depending on the proposition it's taken to express? Don't most sentences fall into that category? --And. > > > ----- Original Message ---- > From: And Rosta > To: lojban@googlegroups.com > Sent: Wed, October 19, 2011 3:27:55 PM > Subject: Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural > variable > > Martin Bays, On 19/10/2011 06:11: >> * Wednesday, 2011-10-19 at 04:59 +0100 - And Rosta: >> >>> Martin Bays, On 18/10/2011 04:26: >>>>>>> For example, {na ku lo cinfo cu zvati lo mi purdi} >>>>>>> has at least the two following meanings in terms of actual lions: >>>>>>> 1. {lo cinfo} is interpreted as a plurality of mundane lions, giving >>>>>>> roughly: >>>>>>> For L some (contextually relevant) lions: \not in(L, my garden) >>>>>>> (which probably means that there exists a lion among L which is not in >>>>>>> my garden) >>>>>>> 2. {lo cinfo} is interpreted as the kind Lions, giving >>>>>>> \not in(Lions, my garden) >>>>>>> which is then resolved existentially, giving >>>>>>> \not \exists l:lion(l). in(l, my garden) . >>>>> Sorry, I was unclear. I meant that English seems to allow only >>>>> reading (2), and that the same might go for Lojban. >>>> Ah! Have {lo} *only* able to get kinds, you mean? >>> Yes. With anything that looks like a 'mundane' reconceived as a kind. >> >> So how would you rule out interpretation 1 in the above? > > By whatever rules out "it is not the case that Obama is in my garden" or "it is > not the case that chlorine is in my garden" from being true in a circumstance in > which some (but not all) Obama/chlorine is in my garden. I suppose the principle > is that referents are treated as atoms rather than as complexes some bits of > which do broda and other bits of which don't necessarily broda; but I'm really > only thinking aloud in saying this. > >>>> The "temporal stages of Obama" example could be dealt with by >>>> intepreting Obama as the kind 'Obama-stages', I agree, but it could also >>>> be dealt with just by using tenses. I'm not sure how to deal with "an >>>> unusually exuberant Obama"... but since it's a rare construction, a hack >>>> like transforming it to "Obama, who was unusually exuberant" would seem >>>> reasonable. >>> >>> The point is that English does allow restrictive modification of >>> _Obama_, so does recognize subtypes of Obama. >> >> "It was the exuberant Obama who spoke today rather than the dour Obama >> we're used to"? That kind of thing? The hacky solution still seems >> reasonable. > > That kind of thing, yes. A hacky solution may or may not be reasonable, but > legitimate justifications for seeking a hackysolution do not include the alleged > absence of this phenomenon from natural language. > >>>> So if I choose to omit kinds from my universe but otherwise use the same >>>> rules, I am likely to be misunderstood by a kind-using lojbanist, even >>>> if I avoid using lV. Xorxes just gave a nice example, the other way >>>> round: {mi zukte da poi do zukte} makes a sense with kinds that it >>>> doesn't without them. >>> >>> You may be likely to be misunderstood, but that's because of >>> philosophical differences between you, not linguistic differences. >>> You don't have to agree on whether{mi zukte da poi do zukte} couod be >>> true. >> >> If that counts as philosophy, then it seems we do have to make >> philosophical pronouncements if we want to well-specify lojban. > > It would be interesting and instructive if that turned out to be the case, > though it's not yet apparent to me that it is. I think rather than talking about > "well-specifiedness", we should distinguish (A) the rules mapping between > phonological form and logical form from (B) the rules mapping between logical > form and the universe. For everybody who wants a logical language, it is > important that (A) be well-specified. But I'm not sure there's anything remotely > approaching a consensus on whether (B) must be well-specified. I myself incline > to the view that it needs to be specified with a certain looseness, partly for > practical reasons -- because while (A) can be specified to perfection, (B) can > never be finished -- and partly because speakers with different views on the > nature of the universe ought still to be able to speak the same language. > >>>> My question is whether you perceive a "jump" between individual lions >>>> and the kind 'lions' of a different kind from that between the kinds >>>> 'fierce lions' and 'lions'. I don't think it's actually a precise >>>> question about the structure of the partial order... it's rather that >>>> I'd split "subtype" into two relations - "instance of" and "subclass >>>> of". >>> >>> I understand your questions. The answer is a very definite No. There >>> are only types, related by the Subtype relation; and there are no >>> instances. >> >> Then I don't think I know at all what your "types" are. They seem to be >> different from xorxes' kinds, which seem (or at least so my >> uncontradicted impression was) to correspond to properties of >> individuals at the level below. > > Hmm. I don't consciously find myself disagreeing with xorxes. Are there further > diagnostic questions you could pose in order to discriminate between my view and > the one you attribute to xorxes? > >>> I think it would be good to have other gadri based on a model in which >>> there are no types, only instances. >> >> And not worry about interactions? > > Between what? Different types of gadri? Probably yes -- don't worry. Or at > least, it's interesting to discuss, but doesn't have to be addressed as part of > the basic specification of Lojban. > >>>>> The objections to that are that it is metaphysically biased, >>>> >>>> Why is that a problem? >>> >>> Avoidance of metaphysical bias was one of Lojban's aims. A fairly >>> obvious and sensible one, since the language should not tell the >>> speaker how the universe is, but rather should allow the speaker to >>> describe how the speaker thinks the universe is. >> >> This seems to be in direct competition with an aim of lojban with which >> I'm more familiar, namely that it be well-specified. Having a thorough >> model-theoretic formal semantics seems to me an important part of >> satisfying that aim - and it would involve specifying a metaphysics (by >> your definition of metaphysics). > > See my comments above about the two types of specification. I think human > languages are thoroughly specified for type (A) (even tho the rules allow > ambiguity) but not for type (B). So I understand the goal of a logical language > as to be like a human language, but for the type (A) rules to exclude ambiguity. > > Nevertheless, I can understand how you might want not only a fully specified > language, but also a fully specified model of the universe, because it promises > perfect communication not only at the level of logical form but also at the > level of semantics. > > But the only Lojbanists I've ever seen ask for fully specified semantics are > John Clifford and you, so I'd say that your understanding of well-specifiedness > is not the normal one. > >>>>>>> "Not every mammal gives birth to live young" -- false for kinds, true >>>>>>> for mundanes; but that doesn't mean "mammal" is ambiguous. >>>>>> >>>>>> So you'd say the statement is simply false, with the kind 'porcupines' >>>>>> as a witness? >>>>> >>>>> I don't understand the question. >>>> >>>> Does every mammal give birth to live young? >>> >>> At the species level yes (afaik), at the organism level no. >> >> And yet 'mammal' wasn't ambiguous? What in the question was? > > Nothing. It's not ambiguous. I mean it's not technically linguistically > ambiguous. In the more general sense of being susceptible to multiple distinct > interpretations, it is of course ambiguous, and the ambiguity has to do with > which mammals there are in the universe of discourse. > > --And. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "lojban" group. To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban?hl=en.