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[87.194.76.177]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id ei16sm19889777wbb.21.2011.11.05.05.06.15 (version=SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Sat, 05 Nov 2011 05:06:16 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <4EB526B7.7070008@gmail.com> Date: Sat, 05 Nov 2011 12:06:15 +0000 From: And Rosta User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.23) Gecko/20110920 Thunderbird/3.1.15 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: lojban@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable References: <4EA7BF06.5050103@gmail.com> <4EAA8AC9.2010000@gmail.com> <20111029001437.GA5535@gonzales> <4EAC2461.4040307@gmail.com> <20111029172822.GC9385@gonzales> <4EAC5B24.4000604@gmail.com> <20111103234955.GA3758@gonzales> <4EB43035.6040407@gmail.com> <20111104233756.GB24058@gonzales> <4EB4A123.7030305@gmail.com> <20111105061247.GE24058@gonzales> In-Reply-To: <20111105061247.GE24058@gonzales> X-Original-Sender: and.rosta@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of and.rosta@gmail.com designates 74.125.82.173 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=and.rosta@gmail.com; dkim=pass (test mode) header.i=@gmail.com Reply-To: lojban@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list lojban@googlegroups.com; contact lojban+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 1004133512417 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: Sender: lojban@googlegroups.com List-Subscribe: , List-Unsubscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) X-Spam_score: -0.7 X-Spam_score_int: -6 X-Spam_bar: / I think the essential difference between us is indeed the semantic-metaphys= ics. On one view, the universe comes with a ready-made set of individuals, = to which predicates apply; propositions make claims about those individuals= . On the other view, the universe is one blob that can be split into uncoun= tably infinitely many subtypes, defined by differentiation criteria. Here's a solution (v) then: have a couple of cmavo that mark these two view= s, the Ready-Made and the Blobular. I really think that would work. Obviously you're a Ready-Madeist, while me and xorxes are Blobularists. Tra= ditional logic (i.e. what John Clifford calls Traditional Western Logic) an= d formal semantics is Ready-Madeist. Cognitive and natural-language-inspire= d approaches to semantics are Blobularist. I was tempted to change the Subject-line, but by now "{zo'e} as close-scope= existentially quantified plural variable" has become the inalienable name = of the thread, a name to which one has come to attach deep sentimental valu= e. =20 Further responses below: Martin Bays, On 05/11/2011 06:12: > * Saturday, 2011-11-05 at 02:36 +0000 - And Rosta: >> As for whether all frenchmen do wear the same beret, that depends on >> beret differentiation criteria. By the usual beret differentiation >> criteria, they don't wear the same beret. But given that it is >> possible to say that we all admire (the same) Obama and that millions >> of children each play with (the same) Barbie, I think that it would be >> possible to think of a Barbie-like Beret that pops up on the heads of >> many different frenchmen. I leave open whether the Barbie-like >> Beretrequires a different predicate from the berets that each pop up >> on only one head. > > Yes, that's exactly the issue. Your Barbie-Beret is a malkind in the > above sense if it satisfies "is a beret". I understand. =20 >>> So in the sense that if we would say that one is true then we'd also sa= y >>> that the other is true, (A) and (B) are equivalent in malkindful lojban= . >> >> Do you mean they are truth-conditionally equivalent, or simply that >> each, when supplemented by auxiliary assumptions, can be inferred from >> the other? > > Something like both... see "metatruth" in my reply to xorxes (which is > clumsy, but I don't see a better way to describe the situation). I understand. It's a useful notion. =20 >> If Barbie-like Beret is a malkind, then (B) is derivable >> from (A) only if it is also the case that all frenchmen wear the same >> beret; if they all wear different berets, you can't derive (B). > > Hmm? Doesn't (A) imply that all french people wear Barbie-Beret? Only metatruly. Under Blobularity, you first have to apply differentiation = criteria to the universe before you can make claims about it. One set of di= fferentiation criteria yields a many-bereted universe, and another set of d= ifferentiation criteria yields a single-bereted universe. (A) itself doesn'= t entail or imply that all Frenchmen wear Barbie-Beret. But (A) can be clai= med of either the many-bereted or single-bereted universe. Under Ready-Made, of course, it is as though one set of differentiation cri= teria was applied to the (Blobular) universe once and for all, and thereaft= er only that universe gets claims made about it. >> So it seems to me that either (A) doesn't entail (B) malkindfully or >> that xorxesianism is not malkindful. > > I don't see what you've done here. I hadn't realized you were talking about metatruth rather than truth. Truth= would be assessed relative to a post-differentiational universe. Metatruth= is assessed relative to the set of all possible post-differentiational uni= verses: claims X and Y are metatruth-conditionally equivalent if there is a= predifferentiational Blobular universe such that there are differentiation= criteria that yield from it a postdifferentiational universe of which X is= true and there are differentiation criteria that yield from it a postdiffe= rentiational universe of which Y is true. =20 >>>> Sure, we know what the difference between one lion and two lions is. >>>> But there are these cases where you can't tell the difference. And >>>> I think that these cases in which the speaker can't tell the >>>> difference should be generalized into a case where for whatever reason >>>> the speaker doesn't tell the difference. >>> >>> But do we really need to create a new entity to do that? In examples >>> like the "lion(s) in your garden every day", we can just give a vague >>> count - {su'o cinfo}, in that case. >> >> Yes, but it looks like one lion, not like a group of one or more >> lions. > > Then {pa ju'o ru'e cinfo}? That doesn't sound like a very Baysian solution... I had been wondering whether to suggest {su'o cinfo pa mei} (disregarding t= he vagueness that tanru introduce), but I'm not sure whether or not that ca= sts us into an infinite regression, since {PA broda} can always be recast (= metatruly?) as {su'o broda PA mei}. =20 >> There's only disagreement on beret-counting. Or Obama-counting: if >> I don't agree that there is only one Obama, then I'd object to you >> claiming that "ro prenu cu prami su'o Obama" and "su'o Obama cu se >> prami ro prenu" are equivalent. > > If you were happy to choose once and for all whether you want multiple > berets (one for each french person, say) or just Barbie-Beret, there > wouldn't be such a problem. But you want both, in different situations, > don't you? With all of them ransedyta'uing? Yes. Ready-Made and Blobular give different metatruthful results. --And. --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= lojban" group. To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegrou= ps.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban= ?hl=3Den.