So let's get started.

Every child being born gets his/her = experience in the form of particular feelings. E.g. the word "mother" denot= es only one object, namely, "The Mother" of this child. "Apple" denotes onl= y the apple being given to this child. The realisation of the fact that the= re are other objects named apples comes later. This is the way from direct = feeling of events to abstractions. This the way to true science the main pr= inciple of which is "the repeatability of events must exist" (i.e. if this = is an apple then may be other apples can emerge in future). This is how the= word "any" comes into lexicon of every child ("Give me any apple" whereas = earlier the child can only want to say "Give the apple in front of me" (eve= n if the child can't express that in words. It doesn't matter. I'm talking = about his/her desire to say that. The child can express that in gestures or= something else).

Not that grown-ups lose such ability of describ= ing specific objects. It's just the frequency of this concept (of specific = objects being sensed) that slowly drops in speech and experience until reac= hing some level.

I'm not an expert on Spinoza but it seems that h= is concept of triple knowledge (opinion, reason, intuition) actually descri= bes subjective knowledge (personal opinion), objective knowledge (science f= ormed by voting of experts on a given topic) and direct feeling (something = that you know from your own experience and no one else can, see the discuss= ion of {vedli} in a separate thread).

Now let's tu= rn to Donellan's views.

The main difference is in the sentence

(1) Smith's murderer is insane

Attributive= use: the sentence is used to say something about whoever uniquely murdered= Smith. Paradigm case: (1) is asserted on purely general grounds.

Referential use: the sentence is used to say something about a particular = person { the one we have in mind. Paradigm case: (1) is asserted on the bas= is of odd behavior by the defendant

The contrast w= ith such an attributive use of (1) is one of those situations in which we e= xpect and intend our audience to realize whom we have in mind when we speak= of Smith's murderer and, most importantly, to know that it is this person = about whom we are going to say something.

Another important thing is that Donnellan uses Russell=92s definitio= n of denoting: =91a definite description denotes an entity if that entity f= its the description uniquely=92. But, like Strawson, he thinks of referring= as a relation between a speaker that the thing he or she means to be talki= ng about.

The keyword here is "uniquely". I = think it's identical to the concept of "the apple" that we have with the ch= ild in the beginning of this post.

Now what xorlo = has to do with it?

lo [PA] broda =3D zo'e noi ke'a broda [gi'e zilkancu li = PA lo broda]

le [PA] broda =3D zo'e noi mi ke'a do skicu lo ka ce'u broda [= gi'e zilkancu li PA lo broda]

I'm not sure that {s= kicu} is the right word. I'm not sure if {le} corresponds to referential us= e.

Of course referential use can't be expressed with {bi'unai} be= cause {bi'unai} can refer to *any* {broda} that we encountered earli= er. And {bi'unai} is more about information known, not about specific objec= t that the speaker and the listener agreed to talk about.

That's all that I can say about Donellan's views for= now. May be additional comments from me will come later.

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