Received: from mail-ob0-f190.google.com ([209.85.214.190]:56099) by stodi.digitalkingdom.org with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.80.1) (envelope-from ) id 1XZCux-000277-A6 for lojban-list-archive@lojban.org; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 22:57:43 -0700 Received: by mail-ob0-f190.google.com with SMTP id uy5sf27016obc.7 for ; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 22:57:32 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlegroups.com; s=20120806; h=date:from:to:message-id:in-reply-to:references:subject:mime-version :x-original-sender:reply-to:precedence:mailing-list:list-id :list-post:list-help:list-archive:sender:list-subscribe :list-unsubscribe:content-type; bh=8SqHzoAtns4CbIUHdTHDa7hdBcy4j5hw9jOjIX9NXeQ=; b=SwMo6AfvgD/t4klVGf8bYLLm3h148Ea10SvNHz2iplOdq4gVeGOiRXvgelRE7ZA3r/ x+5DdUXm9urUgRiuYgRYpzuK1peLTNy+KG7y5KYe2RkRetiAN1SFM1cFh2DZT4Pk118z axeIH6GZEV8gESD6O6/tohrRAzEpMMBLpu/6IwXSeWOTCFibMUCZP2/XYlvzMbqqQkez p+Gf6PY56XTqyr9arPVB3uVzBLhLek4qK/xSBN3mduHHFqHPpvoJLYUDF1qDvBYm31pa 7Sm4e/5f0jrYJE4qQezCgtpvrwVuuj5EYQN1AkyIEeWHdW7393btpnX1/p1iISLjDBsx sG8g== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=date:from:to:message-id:in-reply-to:references:subject:mime-version :x-original-sender:reply-to:precedence:mailing-list:list-id :list-post:list-help:list-archive:sender:list-subscribe :list-unsubscribe:content-type; bh=8SqHzoAtns4CbIUHdTHDa7hdBcy4j5hw9jOjIX9NXeQ=; b=k2YTjz9QoLY2j5x5n/qJoLBO1SQlbFOHHxCue2NNNEQDz2T/0juJ/R9b1AbR0/eJDd A3qZ4i4kk1XQwe0iN5vy+AE6+OjU3TvJ4pbdW3vDZwn/6o3cRJK6Du4gCXDBjviqfQIy iis+XJFtMxHRr23qGqiAqCEqRQ10zrDPNan1fPqI6hg76DfaBDH1MmfeOsvRIWpokohM 322RcUQxUlvoR49MPTNpbXm0q1lPGyGF2iD3T2SxPvWPaY3pzrEES+q5Ag1aSL1Gxbqc x3hjLYm3CiR5qfKur/HMxNApHi8IfZ4xJKsAzCnxlzA4rw+pYsdWACgMYYAMAvXcekc+ dMvA== X-Received: by 10.140.96.165 with SMTP id k34mr150qge.29.1412143052699; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 22:57:32 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: lojban@googlegroups.com Received: by 10.140.87.71 with SMTP id q65ls362882qgd.32.gmail; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 22:57:32 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.140.36.234 with SMTP id p97mr2735qgp.14.1412143052371; Tue, 30 Sep 2014 22:57:32 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 22:57:31 -0700 (PDT) From: TR NS To: lojban@googlegroups.com Message-Id: <8ac756fd-401a-4778-ae50-e54e232b64d0@googlegroups.com> In-Reply-To: References: <34b2a9f0-7ccb-4135-8795-7038cc996b42@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: Speaker specificity: {.i da'i na vajni} MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Original-Sender: transfire@gmail.com Reply-To: lojban@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list lojban@googlegroups.com; contact lojban+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 1004133512417 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_4804_2049733439.1412143051745" X-Spam-Score: -2.0 (--) X-Spam_score: -2.0 X-Spam_score_int: -19 X-Spam_bar: -- ------=_Part_4804_2049733439.1412143051745 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Tuesday, September 30, 2014 11:47:07 PM UTC-4, Alexander Kozhevnikov wrote: > > I just wanted to quickly butt in and voice disagreement with this example: > > On Tue, 30 Sep 2014, Dustin Lacewell wrote: > > I'm putting this here because I was asked to do so (probably for > > completeness in discourse) > > The example I habitually provide is, imagine some men are hanging out by > a > > water-cooler and some women walking past hear them making sexist > remarks. > > One women isn't going to confuse the other by saying something like > "Those > > dogs are disgusting". Does the listener really require such a > > front-and-center indication of non-veridicality? As far as I'm concerned > > the answer is blaring "no". > > I think the answer is a clear 'yes' if you are going to effectively > communicate with speakers who are not familiar to your culture's > metaphors, whether that be primitive AI, hypothetical aliens, or just > people from a culture a few countries away where "dogs" is not a metaphor > for intellectually-primitive-human-males. > > I think overall, having an efficient way to say what you really mean is a > good thing, and in this case, that means having an ability to specify in > a concise manner that something is or isn't metaphorical. > > Having that means the more literal-minded, or those who struggle with > metaphorical speech, such as many autistic individuals for example, can be > readily cued in to what you are implying. It means children (and more > generally though less commonly mentally mature people as well) will be > less likely to pick up mis-conceptions when delving into a new topic - > because sure comparing people to animals is conceptually a fairly > widespread metaphor in its various permutations - but when you get into > less typical/casual matters it's no longer that easy. > > The inability to distinguish between the literal and metaphorical quickly > will also manifest when you have a situation with both literal and > metaphorical instances of the thing involved. The above example becomes > insta-ambiguous if you also add in a couple of actual dogs doing something > disgusting, or appearing disgusting. Of course in your example that > doesn't strike me as a likely problem, but I think it's easy enough to run > into cases like that in practice. > > I think we also overlook another value of the ability to be explicitly > metaphorical: it enables one to readily introduce new metaphors which > otherwise would require more load on the other parties in the conversation > to figure out. This is a generalization of my first point about speakers > who don't know the metaphor being deployed - except instead of limiting > our consideration to metaphors regularly used in one culture being > misunderstood by others, consider how much easier it is to throw a truly > novel metaphor into a conversation - trying this in English has often > generated uncomprehending looks when I've tried it, because I guess some > people just aren't good at recognizing metaphors they aren't familiar with > on the fly. I think we can have more creative and expressive uses of > language if we can readily differentiate the literal meaning from > non-literal. > > Personally, one of the points which currently draw me to Lojban is it's > claimed ability to allow unambiguous communication efficiently. I > want a one-or-two syllable way to draw the distinction between me > being literal and not. (Though I don't have enough lojban knowledge yet to > particularly care whether le/lo have anything to do with making this > distinction.) > > Or maybe I missed the whole point of this "veridicality" discussion, in > which case apologies for me wasting the time you all had to spend to read > this. > I think there might be two different concepts of veridical being confused. You are talking about speaking non-metaphorically. And I agree there certainly should be a way to indicate a statement be taken "seriously" or "literally". However, I'm not sure that is the same as the veridical nature of {lo}, which is supposed to identify things as they "really are". If we were to take that literally then it would (almost) always be a sort of lie because it presupposes omniscience. It is ridiculous to think we know things as they "really are". So when we use "lo" we can --indeed we are still being metaphorical. Pink Unicorns are far from reality but we can still talk about them with "lo xunblabi pavyseljirna". So it's not really reality, but potentiality. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "lojban" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. ------=_Part_4804_2049733439.1412143051745 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Tuesday, September 30, 2014 11:47:07 PM UTC-4, = Alexander Kozhevnikov wrote:
I = just wanted to quickly butt in and voice disagreement with this example:

On Tue, 30 Sep 2014, Dustin Lacewell wrote:
> I'm putting this here because I was asked to do so (probably for
> completeness in discourse)
> The example I habitually provide is, imagine some men are hanging = out by a
> water-cooler and some women walking past hear them making sexist r= emarks.
> One women isn't going to confuse the other by saying something lik= e "Those
> dogs are disgusting". Does the listener really require such a
> front-and-center indication of non-veridicality? As far as I'm con= cerned
> the answer is blaring "no".

I think the answer is a clear 'yes' if you are going to effectively=20
communicate with speakers who are not familiar to your culture's=20
metaphors, whether that be primitive AI, hypothetical aliens, or just= =20
people from a culture a few countries away where "dogs" is not a metaph= or=20
for intellectually-primitive-human-males.

I think overall, having an efficient way to say what you really mean is= a=20
good thing, and in this case, that means having an ability to specify i= n=20
a concise manner that something is or isn't metaphorical.

Having that means the more literal-minded, or those who struggle with= =20
metaphorical speech, such as many autistic individuals for example, can= be=20
readily cued in to what you are implying. It means children (and more= =20
generally though less commonly mentally mature people as well) will be= =20
less likely to pick up mis-conceptions when delving into a new topic -= =20
because sure comparing people to animals is conceptually a fairly=20
widespread metaphor in its various permutations - but when you get into= =20
less typical/casual matters it's no longer that easy.

The inability to distinguish between the literal and metaphorical quick= ly=20
will also manifest when you have a situation with both literal and=20
metaphorical instances of the thing involved. The above example becomes= =20
insta-ambiguous if you also add in a couple of actual dogs doing someth= ing=20
disgusting, or appearing disgusting. Of course in your example that=20
doesn't strike me as a likely problem, but I think it's easy enough to = run=20
into cases like that in practice.

I think we also overlook another value of the ability to be explicitly= =20
metaphorical: it enables one to readily introduce new metaphors which= =20
otherwise would require more load on the other parties in the conversat= ion=20
to figure out. This is a generalization of my first point about speaker= s=20
who don't know the metaphor being deployed - except instead of limiting= =20
our consideration to metaphors regularly used in one culture being=20
misunderstood by others, consider how much easier it is to throw a trul= y=20
novel metaphor into a conversation - trying this in English has often= =20
generated uncomprehending looks when I've tried it, because I guess som= e=20
people just aren't good at recognizing metaphors they aren't familiar w= ith=20
on the fly. I think we can have more creative and expressive uses of=20
language if we can readily differentiate the literal meaning from=20
non-literal.

Personally, one of the points which currently draw me to Lojban is it's= =20
claimed ability to allow unambiguous communication efficiently. I=20
want a one-or-two syllable way to draw the distinction between me=20
being literal and not. (Though I don't have enough lojban knowledge yet= to=20
particularly care whether le/lo have anything to do with making this=20
distinction.)

Or maybe I missed the whole point of this "veridicality" discussion, in= =20
which case apologies for me wasting the time you all had to spend to re= ad=20
this.

I think there might be two different c= oncepts of veridical being confused. You are talking about speaking non-met= aphorically. And I agree there certainly should be a way to indicate a stat= ement be taken "seriously" or "literally". However, I'm not sure that is th= e same as the veridical nature of {lo}, which is supposed to identify thing= s as they "really are". If we were to take that literally then it would (al= most) always be a sort of lie because it presupposes omniscience. It is rid= iculous to think we know things as they "really are". So when we use "lo" w= e can --indeed we are still being metaphorical. Pink Unicorns are far from = reality but we can still talk about them with "lo xunblabi pavyseljirna". S= o it's not really reality, but potentiality.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups &= quot;lojban" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to lojban+unsub= scribe@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http:= //groups.google.com/group/lojban.
For more options, visit http= s://groups.google.com/d/optout.
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