Sender: lojban@googlegroups.com
Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 01:43:37 -0700 (PDT)
From: Curtis Franks <curtis.w.franks@gmail.com>
To: lojban <lojban@googlegroups.com>
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Subject: Re: [lojban] Sensations / qualia (colors etc.)
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Throughout this response, I use "qualia" rather than "quale" at some points=
 because there may be more than one quale associated with that thing, I do =
not want to assume.

> "Is that very different from "I like elephants", "elephants are beautiful=
 animals"?"

Yes, at least from a technical standpoint in Lojban. In Lojban "lo xunre" i=
s a red thing. So, we can only say "I like red things" and "red things are =
beautiful things". To actually capture the essence of redness, we need a ne=
w mechanism. We could also use it in order to capture the qualia of elephan=
tness, but that is only sort of what you probably like or find beautiful. T=
here is an added layer of abstraction or instant-experience there. Red (the=
 color) is a sensation, independent of what is causing it (the stimulus). T=
he essence/being of an elephant is similar, but not really a sensation that=
 I, at least, directly register normally. However, if you had never seen an=
 elephant and I described everything about them to you, and then you eventu=
ally experienced one in real life, any new information that you gained from=
 the experience would presumably be the qualia of elephantness and that is =
something which you would have a firmer grasp on and might like. I would no=
t say, though, that most people are thinking this way when saying that they=
 like elephants, although maybe they could or should (or should could).


> "Is that very different from "I see elephants" when there are no elephant=
s around?"

Again, a little bit. Seeing red is a direct sensation. There is no object i=
nvolved and no processing/deeper understanding. Seeing an elephant is seein=
g an object which is an elephant and interpreting it as such (even if that =
object does not exist, there is no way of knowing that by instanteous visio=
n alone). Of course, there are some qualia to it, but there is also, in the=
 normal interpretation of that statement, something more. It is not impossi=
ble to see the qualia of elephantness, but that is not what you really mean=
, I think.


> "So "I like elephants" becomes "mi nelci lo ganseti be lo ka xanto"?"

No. That is "I like the qualia of elephantness". Liking the object of an or=
 several elephant(s) is just "mi nelci lo xanto". An elephant is one object=
 which has the qualia of elephantness (and, arguably, might be the unique c=
lass with this property). Analogously, "mi nelci lo xunre" is "I like one o=
r several objects which are red". These objects are things which have the q=
uale of redness (possibly and even probably/arguably necessarily among othe=
r qualia). To like redness itself, the very idea and essence and immediate =
sensation of it, one needs the qualia abstraction.


> "I don't see a problem with a word for "qualia", but I don't expect peopl=
e to start saying "I like the qualia of being red" or "I like the qualia of=
 being an elephant" instead of "I like red" or "I like elephants" though. I=
t seems more natural that "lo xanto", "lo xunre" can be elephants (in gener=
al) and red as well as particular elephants or particular red objects. I'd =
rather these ontological distinctions be handled with brivla, not grammatic=
ized with cmavo."

It is a matter of what people should say, not what they currently do say du=
e to bad habits and the failings of natural languages and their own educati=
on and tendencies in using Lojban. If they are alerted to such issues, then=
 they are more likely to improve. As they currently are, and if they ignore=
 these issues, they are incorrect. Lojban is, in my opinion, meant to bring=
 this realization to the surface and then to fix it and to provide the tool=
s for doing so in a reasonable but uncompromisingly rigorous way. Natural u=
sage has nothing to do with it because it is wrong in this case.

I think that a cmavo is extremely beneficial and probably necessary in this=
 case. In general, we may try to avoid staking out ontological positions vi=
a their establishment.

Note that this is not just a philosophical position that is being hardcoded=
 into the language's vocabulary, functionality/support, and grammar. There =
is already a major flaw in the language that must be patched somehow. This =
is one solution, and a versatile and robust one at that. And, like I said, =
it is good to bring awareness to the language's learners about this issue i=
n their own conscious understanding of their cognition.

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