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From: Gleki Arxokuna <gleki.is.my.name@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 12:06:02 +0300
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Subject: Re: [lojban] Sensations / qualia (colors etc.)
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2016-05-12 11:43 GMT+03:00 Curtis Franks <curtis.w.franks@gmail.com>:

> Throughout this response, I use "qualia" rather than "quale" at some
> points because there may be more than one quale associated with that thing,
> I do not want to assume.
>
> > "Is that very different from "I like elephants", "elephants are
> beautiful animals"?"
>
> Yes, at least from a technical standpoint in Lojban. In Lojban "lo xunre"
> is a red thing. So, we can only say "I like red things" and "red things are
> beautiful things". To actually capture the essence of redness, we need a
> new mechanism. We could also use it in order to capture the qualia of
> elephantness, but that is only sort of what you probably like or find
> beautiful. There is an added layer of abstraction or instant-experience
> there. Red (the color) is a sensation, independent of what is causing it
> (the stimulus). The essence/being of an elephant is similar, but not really
> a sensation that I, at least, directly register normally. However, if you
> had never seen an elephant and I described everything about them to you,
> and then you eventually experienced one in real life, any new information
> that you gained from the experience would presumably be the qualia of
> elephantness and that is something which you would have a firmer grasp on
> and might like. I would not say, though, that most people are thinking this
> way when saying that they like elephants, although maybe they could or
> should (or should could).
>
>
>
> > "Is that very different from "I see elephants" when there are no
> elephants around?"
>
> Again, a little bit. Seeing red is a direct sensation. There is no object
> involved and no processing/deeper understanding.


There is still some object that is red. How can you sense red without an
object?

A red apple is on a red table together with a red knife and there is the
red sun that you can see through the red window. All of them together
(table+apple+knife+window+the sun) can be called "one single red thing (or
grand-thing if you wish)".

All of the red things you have ever experiences in your life can be called
"one single red thing" (so that's why "set of all things" in gua\spi
definition although "set" needs more precise definition here, obviously,
the same apple seen two times are two experiences and therefore two
mini-things that are parts of one grand-thing).


Seeing an elephant is seeing an object which is an elephant and
> interpreting it as such (even if that object does not exist, there is no
> way of knowing that by instanteous vision alone). Of course, there are some
> qualia to it, but there is also, in the normal interpretation of that
> statement, something more. It is not impossible to see the qualia of
> elephantness, but that is not what you really mean, I think.
>

So what is meant here?
I've seen several pictures of elephants in books and now I sense a real
elephant. It has the same set of properties as those elephants have
(pictures of whom I read earlier.)
I've seen that red apple, that red knife and now I can see a red ball.
Earlier experiences had red being 640 nm and 660 nm wavelength together (a
mixture of two properties, both wavelengths are expressed with "red").
This red ball is 640 nm only (+ many other properties like roundness etc.)
I've never seen red balls before but this one matches my earlier
experiences so I call it "red". This red ball also has this property of 640
nm as the aopple and the knife.

This elephant also has this property of "has trunk + gray + four legs +
ears" just as those elephants pictured in those books I read earlier.


>
>
>
> > "So "I like elephants" becomes "mi nelci lo ganseti be lo ka xanto"?"
>
> No. That is "I like the qualia of elephantness". Liking the object of an
> or several elephant(s) is just "mi nelci lo xanto". An elephant is one
> object which has the qualia of elephantness (and, arguably, might be the
> unique class with this property). Analogously, "mi nelci lo xunre" is "I
> like one or several objects which are red". These objects are things which
> have the quale of redness (possibly and even probably/arguably necessarily
> among other qualia). To like redness itself, the very idea and essence and
> immediate sensation of it, one needs the qualia abstraction.
>
>
>
> > "I don't see a problem with a word for "qualia", but I don't expect
> people to start saying "I like the qualia of being red" or "I like the
> qualia of being an elephant" instead of "I like red" or "I like elephants"
> though. It seems more natural that "lo xanto", "lo xunre" can be elephants
> (in general) and red as well as particular elephants or particular red
> objects. I'd rather these ontological distinctions be handled with brivla,
> not grammaticized with cmavo."
>
> It is a matter of what people should say, not what they currently do say
> due to bad habits and the failings of natural languages and their own
> education and tendencies in using Lojban. If they are alerted to such
> issues, then they are more likely to improve. As they currently are, and if
> they ignore these issues, they are incorrect. Lojban is, in my opinion,
> meant to bring this realization to the surface and then to fix it and to
> provide the tools for doing so in a reasonable but uncompromisingly
> rigorous way. Natural usage has nothing to do with it because it is wrong
> in this case.
>
> I think that a cmavo is extremely beneficial and probably necessary in
> this case. In general, we may try to avoid staking out ontological
> positions via their establishment.
>
> Note that this is not just a philosophical position that is being
> hardcoded into the language's vocabulary, functionality/support, and
> grammar. There is already a major flaw in the language that must be patched
> somehow. This is one solution, and a versatile and robust one at that. And,
> like I said, it is good to bring awareness to the language's learners about
> this issue in their own conscious understanding of their cognition.


I think the only flaw here is to be still with morphology of English with
its adjective/noun distinction.
E.g. Russian language uses colors as verbs so what? Shall we borrow this
thing into Lojban?

The only lack of precision I can see in red/elephant distinction is that
elephants are more stable in time but this is a vague distinction as people
mentioned many times (e.g. [1]
<https://mw.lojban.org/papri/Tl%C3%B6n,_Uqbar_and_la_gleki's_fishy_apples>).


>
> --
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">2016-05-12 11:43 GMT+03:00 Curtis Franks <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:curtis.w.franks@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">curtis.w.franks@gma=
il.com</a>&gt;</span>:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Throughout this re=
sponse, I use &quot;qualia&quot; rather than &quot;quale&quot; at some poin=
ts because there may be more than one quale associated with that thing, I d=
o not want to assume.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; &quot;Is that very different from &quot;I like elephants&quot;, &quot;=
elephants are beautiful animals&quot;?&quot;<br>
<br>
</span>Yes, at least from a technical standpoint in Lojban. In Lojban &quot=
;lo xunre&quot; is a red thing. So, we can only say &quot;I like red things=
&quot; and &quot;red things are beautiful things&quot;. To actually capture=
 the essence of redness, we need a new mechanism. We could also use it in o=
rder to capture the qualia of elephantness, but that is only sort of what y=
ou probably like or find beautiful. There is an added layer of abstraction =
or instant-experience there. Red (the color) is a sensation, independent of=
 what is causing it (the stimulus). The essence/being of an elephant is sim=
ilar, but not really a sensation that I, at least, directly register normal=
ly. However, if you had never seen an elephant and I described everything a=
bout them to you, and then you eventually experienced one in real life, any=
 new information that you gained from the experience would presumably be th=
e qualia of elephantness and that is something which you would have a firme=
r grasp on and might like. I would not say, though, that most people are th=
inking this way when saying that they like elephants, although maybe they c=
ould or should (or should could).<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; &quot;Is that very different from &quot;I see elephants&quot; when the=
re are no elephants around?&quot;<br>
<br>
</span>Again, a little bit. Seeing red is a direct sensation. There is no o=
bject involved and no processing/deeper understanding.</blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>There is still some object that is red. How can you sense red w=
ithout an object?</div><div><br></div><div>A red apple is on a red table to=
gether with a red knife and there is the red sun that you can see through t=
he red window. All of them together (table+apple+knife+window+the sun) can =
be called &quot;one single red thing (or grand-thing if you wish)&quot;.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>All of the red things you have ever experiences in y=
our life can be called &quot;one single red thing&quot; (so that&#39;s why =
&quot;set of all things&quot; in gua\spi definition although &quot;set&quot=
; needs more precise definition here, obviously, the same apple seen two ti=
mes are two experiences and therefore two mini-things that are parts of one=
 grand-thing).</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex"> Seeing an elephant is seeing an object which is an elephant and inte=
rpreting it as such (even if that object does not exist, there is no way of=
 knowing that by instanteous vision alone). Of course, there are some quali=
a to it, but there is also, in the normal interpretation of that statement,=
 something more. It is not impossible to see the qualia of elephantness, bu=
t that is not what you really mean, I think.<br></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>So what is meant here?</div><div>I&#39;ve seen several pictures of el=
ephants in books and now I sense a real elephant. It has the same set of pr=
operties as those elephants have (pictures of whom I read earlier.)</div><d=
iv>I&#39;ve seen that red apple, that red knife and now I can see a red bal=
l.</div><div>Earlier experiences had red being 640 nm and 660 nm wavelength=
 together (a mixture of two properties, both wavelengths are expressed with=
 &quot;red&quot;).</div><div>This red ball is 640 nm only (+ many other pro=
perties like roundness etc.) I&#39;ve never seen red balls before but this =
one matches my earlier experiences so I call it &quot;red&quot;. This red b=
all also has this property of 640 nm as the aopple and the knife.</div><div=
><br></div><div>This elephant also has this property of &quot;has trunk + g=
ray + four legs + ears&quot; just as those elephants pictured in those book=
s I read earlier.</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding=
-left:1ex">
<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; &quot;So &quot;I like elephants&quot; becomes &quot;mi nelci lo ganset=
i be lo ka xanto&quot;?&quot;<br>
<br>
</span>No. That is &quot;I like the qualia of elephantness&quot;. Liking th=
e object of an or several elephant(s) is just &quot;mi nelci lo xanto&quot;=
. An elephant is one object which has the qualia of elephantness (and, argu=
ably, might be the unique class with this property). Analogously, &quot;mi =
nelci lo xunre&quot; is &quot;I like one or several objects which are red&q=
uot;. These objects are things which have the quale of redness (possibly an=
d even probably/arguably necessarily among other qualia). To like redness i=
tself, the very idea and essence and immediate sensation of it, one needs t=
he qualia abstraction.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; &quot;I don&#39;t see a problem with a word for &quot;qualia&quot;, bu=
t I don&#39;t expect people to start saying &quot;I like the qualia of bein=
g red&quot; or &quot;I like the qualia of being an elephant&quot; instead o=
f &quot;I like red&quot; or &quot;I like elephants&quot; though. It seems m=
ore natural that &quot;lo xanto&quot;, &quot;lo xunre&quot; can be elephant=
s (in general) and red as well as particular elephants or particular red ob=
jects. I&#39;d rather these ontological distinctions be handled with brivla=
, not grammaticized with cmavo.&quot;<br>
<br>
</span>It is a matter of what people should say, not what they currently do=
 say due to bad habits and the failings of natural languages and their own =
education and tendencies in using Lojban. If they are alerted to such issue=
s, then they are more likely to improve. As they currently are, and if they=
 ignore these issues, they are incorrect. Lojban is, in my opinion, meant t=
o bring this realization to the surface and then to fix it and to provide t=
he tools for doing so in a reasonable but uncompromisingly rigorous way. Na=
tural usage has nothing to do with it because it is wrong in this case.<br>
<br>
I think that a cmavo is extremely beneficial and probably necessary in this=
 case. In general, we may try to avoid staking out ontological positions vi=
a their establishment.<br>
<br>
Note that this is not just a philosophical position that is being hardcoded=
 into the language&#39;s vocabulary, functionality/support, and grammar. Th=
ere is already a major flaw in the language that must be patched somehow. T=
his is one solution, and a versatile and robust one at that. And, like I sa=
id, it is good to bring awareness to the language&#39;s learners about this=
 issue in their own conscious understanding of their cognition.=C2=A0</bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>I think the only flaw here is to be still with m=
orphology of English with its adjective/noun distinction.</div><div>E.g. Ru=
ssian language uses colors as verbs so what? Shall we borrow this thing int=
o Lojban?</div><div><br></div><div>The only lack of precision I can see in =
red/elephant distinction is that elephants are more stable in time but this=
 is a vague distinction as people mentioned=C2=A0many times (e.g. <a href=
=3D"https://mw.lojban.org/papri/Tl%C3%B6n,_Uqbar_and_la_gleki&#39;s_fishy_a=
pples">[1]</a>).</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">
<span class=3D""><br>
--<br>
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ban</a>.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">For more options, visit <a href=3D"=
https://groups.google.com/d/optout" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://groups.google.com/d/optout</a>.<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

<p></p>

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