From nobody@digitalkingdom.org Thu Mar 23 09:08:27 2006 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:08:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from nobody by chain.digitalkingdom.org with local (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1FMTI7-0001Aw-UX for lojban-list-real@lojban.org; Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:08:08 -0800 Received: from web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com ([68.142.199.119]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with smtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1FMTI5-0001An-JG for lojban-list@lojban.org; Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:08:07 -0800 Received: (qmail 1184 invoked by uid 60001); 23 Mar 2006 17:08:01 -0000 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=sbcglobal.net; h=Message-ID:Received:Date:From:Subject:To:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=UA2c3Kwr10boyVt74iJcWSLQuJ7JDdh7y6RT9B+o552NVCD6HOmdDrHTW1qxQEXqiwbvRWkqQ70YrlHLmsCF4lRRX1CGG4mp298M6tx9Vrnk2MeJjg6yhm6cFHNk0XCASxRO4IqjHVC3LXNlIAiHGL2sRJZ8Y8q+iPmZx3zmbd8= ; Message-ID: <20060323170801.1182.qmail@web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Received: from [70.230.183.14] by web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com via HTTP; Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:08:01 PST Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 09:08:01 -0800 (PST) From: John E Clifford Subject: [lojban] Re: semantic primes To: lojban-list@lojban.org In-Reply-To: <925d17560603230607o56c91fa3h2a4e93ddaa27f106@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-archive-position: 11230 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: clifford-j@sbcglobal.net Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 3/22/06, John E Clifford > wrote: > > No one claimed they were built up from others > in > > any sense but that it is possible to define > all > > concepts starting from just a few (relatively > > speaking). The alternative is to say that a > > language (it would only take one to make the > > point) cannot completely define its > vocabulary. > > Consider these two theses: > > (A) Most concepts can be very well defined in > terms of > other concepts. The objections below work pretty well for this as well. And the issue is whether something can really be said to be defined if it is ultimately in its definiens, as would often be the case here. > (B) Every concept (except a selected few) can > be perfectly > defined in terms of other concepts. > > I don't think anyone would have much to argue > against (A), it is > pretty much an observable truth. What, even though false? (B) is a much > harder nut to > swallow. True, but that may just mean that definitions are ultimately impossible. Or, on the other hand, that the list of primes is much larger than we had hoped. > And that's just about concepts. When it comes > to words, things get > much more muddied. Words generally point to a > conceptual area more > than to a strictly delimited concept, and the > concept they bring up > in a given use varies depending on other words > used in their context. > So defining a word is much more tricky than > defining a concept. Well, words are, as we say, polysemous, so eachmay have several definitions corresponding to slightly different concepts and f0or use n slightly different contexts (how much context interacts with a given definition to produce a different meaning wihtout a different definition is a matter that needs more investigation). But this is only a practical, not a theoretical, problem. > > > The most one could get would be overlapping > > partial definition sets, with the bottom > level of > > one set being at a higher level in some > other(s). > > As a practical matter, given a finite span > of > > concern, this is sufficient pehaps, if we > don't > > get caught in a circle. For a theory, > however, > > it is a disaster, since it means that a > language > > can only be completely defined in another > > language and so on to an infinite regress. > > And the thesis that a language can be > "completely defined" must > be taken as self-evident? No, it is a hypothesis being tested. the test, of course, assumes that it is true and works on from there. Should the tests ultimately fail, then the hypothesis would have to be abandoned. However, that part of the hypothesis has a good deal of prior probability, given the arguments above and our actual experience. > > As > > usual, it seems best to stop at the first > step if > > possible. NSM holds that it is possible for > each > > language and furthermore that the initial > step in > > every language is the same (directly > > intertranslatable). > > Yes, it's an attractive thesis, but not a very > convincing one from > the evidence at hand. And I don't see the > "logical argument" > for it yet. What part of the argument do you not understand? To run therough it again, trying not to skip over even the most obvious steps: A definition of a concept is giving an equivalent in terms of other, more basic concepts. Concept A is more basic than concept B if, at a minimum, B does not occur, however remotely, in the definiens to A. Now then, suppose every concept can be completely defined. A is defined in terms of B and C, each more basic than A; B, say, is defined in terms of D and E, each more baisc than B or A, and so on. But then no concept is evr completely defined, since, at each step, the definition involves concpets which are, ex hypothesi, to be defined in terms of yet further concpts. That is, there is always a yet-to-be-defined component. To be sure, as a practical matter, we can stop off with a partial definition which may be an adequate guide to usage and meaning because we are (we think, any how) familiar enough with the concepts then in play, just as even a circular "definition" can guide our usage -- even our understanding. But the hypothesis that every concept can be completely defined is false. The alternative is then that some concepts cannot be completely defined. Since they are functioning concepts, we (well, somebody) understand(s) them. But, more strongly, it turns out that every concept eventually leads to some undefinable concepts (else some concepts would have infinte definitions, which, as noted above, are not definitions at all -- i.e., these are indefinable). Thus, pooling these resources, we get a set of undefinable concepts in terms of which all the others are defined. NSM's steps beyond this are to claim that this set is small (around 100, say), that it is the same in every language, and that this [a given list] is it. All these later steps are open to challenge as is the notion of a complete definition, but the heart of the argument remsins. > > > The definitions I've read for other > concepts > > > don't look much like > > > fixed expressions. > > > > I don't follow this, I think. Do you mean > that > > in other languages, the words that correspond > to > > the concepts are not fixed expressions? > > No, I haven't seen the proposed sets for any > language other than > English. I'd be interested to see the > corresponding set proposed for > Spanish for example, but I wasn't able to find > it. I can't give you a reference although I think Spanish is one of the languages that has been worked with fairly extensively. If you can a copy of the 2 vol. book from about 2002, there is probably some Spanish material in it (I haven't been able to find it in any local library and I am not about to order it at megabucks, even from Megabooks). I've seen pieces of the list for a number of languages, but none I know, so I can't check them. However, the attacks on NSM rarely take the form of saying that the word they pick for such and such a concept doesn't mean that concept. > > If you > > can make that case for any language you have > shot > > down the NSM project in its present form, > since > > that fixed form is a requirement to be a > prime. > > If you mean that NSM definition (strictly > > "reductive paraphrases") don't seem to be in > > fixed form, I'd like to see a case. > > Well, I've only seen two or three NSM > definitions given as examples. Is > there a comprehensive list of definitions > somewhere? I wish there were. There are a few definitions for English that get repeated over and over and about a dozen more that I have managed to get from here and there, plus maybe another dozen -- mainly about emotions, curiously -- for other languages but in English. I am sure there are a lot more, but plowing therough the literature (indeed, finding the literature) is too time-consuming for now and my present purpose. > For example: > > NSM definition of loves [2] > Person-X loves Person-Y = > X often thinks about Y > X thinks good things about Y > X wants to do good things for Y > X wants good things to happen to Y > when X thinks about Y, X often wants to be with > Y > when X thinks about Y, X often feels something > good > > (From this I now gather that the prime THINK is > {pensi} and not > {jinvi}. Actually it seems to be somewhere in between: "x thinks y about z," which fits closer to {jinvi} and has subject-raising. This is actually currently a matter of controversy, since apparently there are languages which allow "x thinks y" and "x thinks about z" but not both claims in a single form. Lojban may have the drop on NSM here (if we get rid of subject raising). >I also notice a few non-primes there, > but I guess they > have already been pre-defined.) That is either an item of faith or else the move is obvious >Now, given > that, what would be > the problem of defining: > > X is bad = > X is the opposite of good > > How is that less of a fixed expression than the > expressions used > for "loves"? Well, if you can work out a case for English, I suppose the reason for rejecting it would be in some Austronesian language. But notice that your definition is not one of the canonical form and the NSMers insist that the sentential forms allowed are as much a part of the system as the concepts. What would be the paradigm sentence for for OPPOSITE (or THE OPPOSITE OF)? 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