From cbmvax!uunet!cuvma.bitnet!LOJBAN Fri Oct 11 10:59:12 1991 Return-Path: Date: Fri Oct 11 10:59:12 1991 Message-Id: <9110111315.AA12938@relay1.UU.NET> Reply-To: Logical Language Group Sender: Lojban list From: Logical Language Group Subject: krici vs. jinvi X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan , Ken Taylor , List Reader Status: RO I did this earlier, but in the context of attitudinal discussion. Belief is something you can have without any evidence or justrification. I can believe a lot of things without holding an opinion on them. Opinion is some kind of rationalized (or maybe irrationalized depending on your opinion of the other guy's opinion %^) concept. I see opinions as closer to ideas - they are thought about, questioned, etc. Beliefs are less thought about. Jihn Cowan has poproposed separately that jinvi needs an x3 place for grounds/ justification, given my definition. I'm inclined to agree, and this would add another example set to the gismu collections that differ most significant;ly in place structure as opposed to inherent meaning. So how about: jinvi x1 holds opinion x2/thinks x2 true on grounds x3 krici x1 believes x2 djuno x1 knows fact x2 about subject x3 by epistemology x4 Hmm. Parallelism requires jinvi and krici to have 'about ...' places, so if parallelism is used, these need to be added. In usage I have opinions about politics. I have beliefs about God. Not having the other lists posted recently at my fingertips, let me identfy a couple of significant pairs of gismu that may not have been mentioned. x1 is a fact (in the absolute - independent of epistemology) (fatci jetnu x1 is true under epistemology x2 jitfa x1 is false under epistemology x2 datni (data) is also related: x1 is data about x2 for use x3 but not as closely. Now looking at these place structures, I can see that my intent is that you hold jinvi about truth; you krici about fact. Truth is relative; fact at least theoretically, is absolute. (By definition - let's not get into philosophical arguments: 'fatci' is that which is independent of observer/ epistemology, etc.; the set of facts may be the null set in your belief) Any help, or have I just muddied the waters again? By the way, I consider the question about place structure to be one that any Lojbanist is qualified to weigh in on. This is an explicit example of when 'lojbab doesn't decide' or 'pull rank'. Only if no agreement can be reached as a consensus will >I< be the one to decide. ---- lojbab = Bob LeChevalier, President, The Logical Language Group, Inc. 2904 Beau Lane, Fairfax VA 22031-1303 USA 703-385-0273 lojbab@grebyn.com NOTE THAT THIS IS A NEW NET ADDRESS AND SUPERSEDES OTHERS IN MY POSTINGS OR LOGICAL LANGUAGE GROUP, INC. PUBLICATIONS