Message-Id: <199310221912.AA03617@eli.CS.YALE.EDU>
Date:         Tue, 19 Oct 1993 12:48:20 EDT
Reply-To: "Robert J. Chassell" <bob@GRACKLE.STOCKBRIDGE.MA.US>
Sender: Lojban list <LOJBAN%CUVMB.bitnet@YaleVM.YCC.YALE.EDU>
From: "Robert J. Chassell" <bob@GRACKLE.STOCKBRIDGE.MA.US>
Subject:      Re: "science" defined
To: Erik Rauch <rauch>
In-Reply-To:  <9310191047.AA23049@albert.gnu.ai.mit.edu> (message from Logical               Language Group on Tue, 19 Oct 1993 06:43:56 -0400)
Status: RO

    There are two definitions of science that I have seen used by
    intellectuals.  The one used by scientists...  Another definition
    ...seems to mean a large systematized body of knowledge or field
    of study.

A third definition is that science is the only successful form of
non-coercive transcultural communication.  Science enables you
peacefully to persuade the students of your enemy that you are right.

Before I attempt to persuade you of the truth of this definition, let
me say that this discussion takes us to the core of the Loglan
project.  The logical languages enable you to speak utterances that
not only are logically true or false, but that contain veridical
claims.  They help you engage in science and in transcultural
communication.

Suppose I say,

    solri
    Observe! The sun.

you might say,

    go'i
    Yes, I agree that it is truthful to say what you just said.

But sometimes you do not say {go'i}.  Then what?

Having expressed an utterance in Lojban, there are two possible outcomes:

  * The listener immediately agrees, {go'i}.

    As a practical matter, neither the speaker nor the listener are
    likely to perceive a problem when both agree as to the truth of an
    utterance.  (Of course, a third person might find both the speaker
    and the listener abysmally wrong, but that is another matter.)

    Alternatively,

  * The listener is in some way unhappy with the utterance.
    He or she may not comprehend it or may disagree with it.

    In this case, the speaker and the listener have a problem.

Perhaps the listener does not understand what the speaker intends.

Through its grammar, Lojban prevents certain kinds of lexical ambiguity.

Suppose I say:

    le nanmu cu crino
    That which I designate as a man is green.

Your won't find any ambiguity in this sentence even when you know that
{le nanmu} is a woman in a green Holloween costume.  You will realize
that I speak of `the green one' as `that which I designate as a man';
I am not making a claim that the green one is a man.  You could say
{go'i}.

However, I can make a veridical claim regarding the sex of the green
one.  Suppose I say,

    lo nanmu cu crino
    That which really is a man is green.

You consider this claim false.

Why?  Let's presume you heard someone say that the green one is a
woman.  You would have uttered to yourself:

    ti'e lo crino cu ninmu
    I hear (via hearsay) that that which really is a green one is a woman.

How could I persuade you that your utterance is false and that my
utterance is true?

There are several ways:

  * You could defer to my right to define situations, as priests and
    other such people do in rituals, like that of marriage.

    I would say: {ca'e lo crino cu nanmu}
                  I define ....

    However, this is not a conventional ritual situation, so I suspect
    that this would not persuade you.

  * You could defer to my knowledge of who dresses in what type of
    costume at Holloween.

    I could say: {ka'u lo crino cu nanmu}
                  I know culturally ...

    But you might know that in American culture, there is no link
    between the color of a Holloween costume and the sex of the person
    wearing it.  (There is, however, a link, I won't say how strong,
    between the sex of a baby and the color of its blanket.)

  * You could defer to my prophetic powers.

    I could say: {se'o lo crino cu nanmu}
                  I know by internal experience
                  (dream, vision, or personal revelation) ...

    But you may doubt the validity of my visions.

  * You could defer to what I claim is an observation:

    I could say: {za'a lo crino cu nanmu}
                  I know by observation ...

     But you may not believe that I correctly recognized what I saw.

Note that all these forms of persuasion require you to defer in some
manner to *my* assertion.  You may not be the sort of person who
defers.  What then?

If you do not defer to another person, the only person who can
persuade you of a truth is you yourself.  No one else.  Only you.

In this case, if you only defer to yourself, and if I wish to
communicate with you, I must revise my communications such that they
enable you to defer to yourself rather than to me.

This brings us to what science is about: science is an endeavor in
which people create utterances the truths of which are judged by
listeners who defer only to themselves, not to others.  (And insofar
as Lojban listeners defer only to themselves, this is what Lojban is
all about.)

These utterances with which we are concerned have the characteristic
that they enable the listener, not the speaker, to say {za'a}, I
observe, or {ja'o}, I conclude.

Thus, mathematical proofs are written such that a listener can follow
the proof and conclude that it is correct.  An experiment is designed
so that a person can duplicate it and observe what the writer
observed.  An astronomical observation is described such that a reader
can replicate the observation.  An astronomical theory is expressed
such that a reader can replicate the observations, follow the
reasoning, compare how consistent the inferences are with other
knowledge of the listener, and come to a conclusion.

(Of course, as a practical matter, many people make judgements as to
when and under what conditions to defer to others, such as to the
writers of textbooks.  Rather than replicate all the experiments,
follow all the proofs, examine all the theories, they examine a
sampling of them, and then conclude that deference to a particular set
of sources is practicable.  I am not talking about this, but about the
procedures followed in the first place to decide what is true or
false.)

It does not matter if the listener refuses to defer to the claims of
the speaker.  The speaker does not persuade.  The only persuader is
the listener, who persuades himself or herself.

I would say: {ko cpedu lo fatci le nanmu}
              Ask the truth of that person which I designate as a man.

You could then ask, if you wish, and if you receive an answer, you may
be able to say

    za'a lo crino cu ninmu
    I observe that that which really is a green one is a woman.
or
    ja'o lo crino cu ninmu
    I conclude that that which really is a green one is a woman.


This form of communication means that disagreements over what is
claimed to be observed are irrelevant.  The trustworthness of the
speaker is not a factor.  For example, the claim that there are spots
on the sun contradicts the assertions of mainstream Catholic
Christianity prior to 1600 AD.  If I am a Cardinal of the Church, I do
not need to judge your honesty or your intent (maybe you are a heathen
trying to make trouble, like a modern day propagandist; maybe you are
seeing hallucinations).  I need only defer to observations made by
myself (or I can refuse to take part on the attempted communication by
not making the observation).


This form of communication also means that disagreements over cultural
knowledge are irrelevant.  For example, I do not need to defer to your
claim that a woman can fly a jet airplane; I can teach a woman how to
fly and then observe whether she can indeed fly a jet.  (It is not so
long ago that many people `knew culturally' that women could not fly
jets.  A close friend of mine told me that she vividly remembers being
laughed at when she was seven years old and said she wanted to fly
jets like her father.)

This is why I say that science is a form of trans-cultural
communication.  People from different cultures often disagree; they do
not share similar items of culturally defined knowledge, and seldom
defer to the authorities or prophets of the other culture.  Only by
creating a utterance that enables a person to observe, reason, and
conclude for himself or herself are you creating the possibility of
both of you agreeing on the truth or falsehood of the utterance.  (The
listener may not want to take part in the communication; that is a
different issue.)

Of course, people can be coerced into expressing agreement.  `Baptism
by the sword' is an example.  If I control sufficient armed force and
tell people that they must abandon their old religion and adapt a new
one, or else die, the majority will adapt the new religion (in
public).  The new religion may fairly thoroughly displace the old if
over several generations, my successors consistently kill the parents
of children who inadvertently express forbidden knowledge.

Coercive persuasion is not science.  Science is an invitation to
explore whether you yourself conclude that an utterance is truthful.

Of course, you do not have to accept the invitation.  You are not
required to look at the projection of the sunspots through the
telescope (some did not).  Similarly, you are not required to consider
the biology, you do not need to consider mathematics, physics and
chemistry, you do not need to reproduce the five lines of reasoning
regarding evolution by natural selection, and you do not need to judge
the truth of the utterance that "Complex structures can self-assemble
from simpler structures."

A non-coercive utterance is an invitation, no more.

Since such an utterance is an invitation rather than a requirement,
your interlocutor may not accept it.  This is why I said that "Science
enables you peacefully to persuade the students of your enemy that you
are right."  Your enemy may not accept your invitation.  But I have
found by observation, {za'a}, that students of an enemy are often
willing to accept an invitation (usually, of course, to prove how
foolish you are and how wise their teacher is...then they discover
that they have persuaded themselves that you are right....)

As a practical matter, scientific utterances are especially likely to
be subject to disagreement.  As Wolpert points out in "The Unnatural
Nature of Science", most scientific truths are not obvious.  For
example, I can tell you by observation that when I stop pushing a
heavy rock, it will stop moving.  This might lead me to conclude, as
did Aristotle, that heavy rocks have a natural tendency to stay at
rest.

In my everyday experience, it is the opposite of obvious that a heavy
rock will stay in motion unless a force acts upon it.  It takes
effort, technology, and genius to discover this.  And it takes
properly constructed utterances, such as Newton's "Principia", to
enable others to decide for themselves whether an utterance claiming
this is true.

In brief, Lojban is designed around the truth and falsehood of
utterances.  This means it will, we hope, prove to be a language that
helps science and thereby eases non-coercive transcultural
communication.

    Robert J. Chassell               bob@gnu.ai.mit.edu
    Rattlesnake Mountain Road        bob@grackle.stockbridge.ma.us
    Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA   (413) 298-4725