Message-Id: <m0ovCWw-0000PYC@xiron.pc.helsinki.fi>
Date:         Thu, 4 Nov 1993 16:40:00 EST
Reply-To:     protin%USL.COM@FINHUTC.hut.fi
Sender:       Lojban list <LOJBAN%CUVMB.BITNET@FINHUTC.hut.fi>
From:         Art Protin <protin%USL.COM@FINHUTC.hut.fi>
Subject:      Re: TECH: more thoughts on zi'o
To:           Veijo Vilva <veion@XIRON.PC.HELSINKI.FI>
Content-Length: 3000
Lines: 73

Thank you John!

John Cowan quotes and comments:

>> (Tell me again John why the loglan predicate "bluer-than" is
>> impossible to use with negation.)
>
> It's not impossible per se, it just makes the reading of
> "blanu(a,...)" as "a is blue" untenable, because "~blanu(a,...)"
> ends up meaning "it is false that a is bluer than something" or
> "it is false that a is bluer than anything", depending on whether
> the hearer infers an existentially or a universally quantified
> value for the ellipsis.

> Both of these can be refuted by particulars: on the existential
> reading, "leaves are not blue" comes out false, because leaves
> are bluer than, say, the sun; on the universal reading, "the
> sky is not blue" comes out true, because the sky is not as blue
> as a standard-blue color chip.

As I said in my post of a few minutes ago:

> I expect that all implied components of my speech will be
> understood in the full context of what I have said.

The application of this rule gives then only one interpretation
of "~blanu(a,...)", ie. "There exists x such that it is false
that a is bluer-than x".  The single interpretation allows both
"leaves are not blue" and "the sky is not blue".  I have no
problem with either.  If the sky seemed plenty blue to me,
I might be suspicious of the claim that it was not blue-enough
and request that the implied x be made explicit.  However, I
have heard all sorts of such claims.  I very fondly remember
the scene from Crocodile Dundee where:
        Young man waves a six inch switchblade and demands money.
        Date suggests compliance and notes
                "He's got a knife".
        Dundee says "that's not a knife", produces his
                fourteen inch Bowie and declares
                "This is a knife".
        Young man leaves quickly, without money.


Informal communication generally relies a lot on implication.
Humans have a great capacity to deal with these implications.
We adjust the proportion of implied to explicit information
in relation to our estimations of the cost of miscommunication.
In dialogs, we can take the initiative to request that various
implied details be made explicit.


> You can't have it both ways.  Saying that something is not
> blue simply cannot be construed as any sort of implicit
> comparison.  Remember that "not" here is always contradictory
> negation; I am not talking about "non-blue".

John, I did not wwant it both ways.  I think I am content
with "There exists an x such that it is false that the sky
is bluer-than x".  And I see the implicit comparison as
always being there in subjective claims, especially with
colors, and even in English.

Is there an easy construct for the complementary relations
the non-travels, non-blues, non-children, non-senses?

    thank you all,
    Art Protin


Arthur Protin <protin@usl.com>
STANDARD DISCLAIMER: The views expressed are strictly those of the author and
are in no way indictative of his employer, customers, or this installation.