Return-Path: <@FINHUTC.HUT.FI:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from FINHUTC.hut.fi by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0qnKkm-00005XC; Wed, 21 Sep 94 09:02 EET DST Message-Id: Received: from FINHUTC.HUT.FI by FINHUTC.hut.fi (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 6679; Wed, 21 Sep 94 09:00:33 EET Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin MAILER@SEARN) by FINHUTC.HUT.FI (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6675; Wed, 21 Sep 1994 09:00:30 +0200 Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin LISTSERV@SEARN) by SEARN.SUNET.SE (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 5492; Wed, 21 Sep 1994 07:59:15 +0200 Date: Wed, 21 Sep 1994 02:00:28 -0400 Reply-To: Logical Language Group Sender: Lojban list From: Logical Language Group Subject: Re: any X-To: jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU X-cc: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: Veijo Vilva Content-Length: 2429 Lines: 55 JL>By "more likely" which do you mean: JL> JL>(1) In most contexts where that Lojban sentence appears, it means something JL> like the second expansion, but in some contexts it may mean something JL> like the first. JL> JL>(2) It always means the same one of them, but you are not sure which, and JL> you suspect it is the second, that's why you say "more likely". JL> JL> JL>If (1) then you are throwing logic out the window, and saying that just JL>like in English "I need a box" can have two meanings (Quine's transparent/ JL>opaque), the same happens in Lojban, and which meaning it is is determined JL>by context. JL> JL>If (2) then the way we've been interpreting most other predicates is wrong. JL>(Unless you say that {nitcu} should be interpreted in a different way than JL>other predicates.) (1), I think (it is 2am %^) JL>> I'm not sure about truth-fucntional value JL>> of the second expansion - what the value is of "le nu [false statement]" JL>> is not clear. JL> JL>Because there is no truth value for it. It is a sumti, and sumti don't have JL>truth values. I would even question that in "le nu [statement]", there is JL>any truth value for that [statement], since it is not being claimed. Staements about non-0existent things are meaningless (they may be defined as false because they are meaningless, but this is definitional). The present king of France is bald. has problems being evaluated truth-functionally because if it is false, then its logical negation (contradictory) must therefore be true. Similarly, if unicorns do not exist, then "I need a unicorn", and "It is false that I need a unicorn" are both incorrect statements (false?) JL>> However your clarification may point to the fact that se nitcu should be a JL>> abstraction regardless about how we resolve the "lo"/"any" question. JL> JL>This is what was done to {djica}, which is analogous to {nitcu}. But I JL>don't see why the transparent meaning should be forbidden. {mi nitcu le vi JL>tanxe} JL>= "I need this box", makes perfect sense. And so does {mi djica le vi tanxe} Does it? The (1) or (2) dichotomy above suggests that there is always a sumti raising going on, and we are allowing the raising when there is no scope problem, and not otherwise. That is, I think, different than the way we have dealt with other raising questions (not necessarily wrong, but we really oughta know what we are dealing with). lojbab