From LOJBAN%CUVMB.BITNET@uga.cc.uga.edu Fri Sep 23 02:42:06 1994 Received: from uga.cc.uga.edu by nfs1.digex.net with SMTP id AA10267 (5.67b8/IDA-1.5 for ); Fri, 23 Sep 1994 02:42:03 -0400 Message-Id: <199409230642.AA10267@nfs1.digex.net> Received: from UGA.CC.UGA.EDU by uga.cc.uga.edu (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 4734; Fri, 23 Sep 94 02:45:50 EDT Received: from UGA.CC.UGA.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@UGA) by UGA.CC.UGA.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 6336; Fri, 23 Sep 1994 02:45:48 -0400 Date: Fri, 23 Sep 1994 07:42:19 +0100 Reply-To: ucleaar Sender: Lojban list From: ucleaar Subject: Re: TECH: "any" & quantification To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu In-Reply-To: (Your message of Thu, 22 Sep 94 15:52:19 CST.) Status: RO Chris: > >> By the way, is "xa'a" as I've defined it the same as asserting existence? > > > >Does {mi viska lo pavyseljirna} assert existance, or the fact that there > >are no unicorns makes the sentence false? > > How can "I can look at a unicorn" possibly be true statement, unless I > exist, and at least one unicorn exists? That's why I think useful > transparent statements with the hypothetical "xa'a" have to implicitly > assert existence. Right, but it can be existence in a fantasy world rather than the real one. "There is a unicorn that I imagined" can be true evn if the unicorn exists only in my imagination. I don't think unicorns really have any bearing on the 'any' debate. --- And