Return-Path: <@FINHUTC.HUT.FI:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from FINHUTC.hut.fi by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0qoXjL-00001DC; Sat, 24 Sep 94 17:05 EET DST Message-Id: Received: from FINHUTC.HUT.FI by FINHUTC.hut.fi (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 8028; Sat, 24 Sep 94 17:04:05 EET Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin MAILER@SEARN) by FINHUTC.HUT.FI (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 8026; Sat, 24 Sep 1994 17:04:00 +0200 Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin LISTSERV@SEARN) by SEARN.SUNET.SE (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 2930; Sat, 24 Sep 1994 16:02:43 +0200 Date: Sat, 24 Sep 1994 09:56:57 -0400 Reply-To: "Robert J. Chassell" Sender: Lojban list From: "Robert J. Chassell" Subject: Re: specificity and metonymy X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: Veijo Vilva In-Reply-To: <9409240126.AA27617@albert.gnu.ai.mit.edu> (message from ucleaar on Sat, 24 Sep 1994 00:25:17 +0100) Content-Length: 4112 Lines: 104 > It has been established ... that LE/LO is +/-specific This is somewhat misleading. {le} may well be *less* specific to a *listener* than {lo}. For example, I have had occasion to say, I need a cloud. I did not have a specific cloud in mind, nor even a specific *type* of cloud. Nor was I looking for what I would specify as a manifestation of Mr. Cloud. The sociological context of the intended photograph was that the image to be perceived by the viewer as a cloud would be considered as a photograph of that which is really a cloud. It was not supposed to be a faked photograph. I could have said, mi nitcu le dilnu I need/require/am dependent on that which I designate as a cloud. That utterance would be specific in my mind, but it contains less information to a listener than mi nitcu lo dilnu I need/require/am dependent on that which really is a cloud. The use of {lo} suggests that speaker and listener agree on or have procedures for coming to agreement on `that which really is'. In this circumstance {lo} conveys more specificity than {le}, since one of the qualities of the looked-for cloud is its reality. As for metonymy: I would *not* want to use one of the abstractors to say something to the effect that I want an event or experience with the following affordances... (The jargon word `affordance' is the use provided by an entity to the person using it; a door `affords' pushing open, a roof `affords' shelter.) I could speak in terms of affordances, and it is often worth while doing so (especially with doors that appear to signal to you to push when you actually have to pull them open, or with a set of light switches in which you switch the switch that you think turns on the light over the stage and the light at the back of the room comes on.) However, in this case, I am not speaking in terms of affordances. Yes, you can say that in some sense, when I say, `I need a cloud', I am really saying that I am needing certain properties or qualities. But I am speaking metonymically: the word `cloud' stands for the the properties or qualities it possesses. Moreover, the `standing for' is not supposed to be marked, because marking takes more time and sound.. Much of the time, in any language, I want to speak metonymically. It is easier and shorter and communication still works. (I think that humans evolved to think metonymically, among other characteristics, but that is an other topic.) Hence, when I am packing, I may say mi nitcu lo tanxe meaning that I need the qualities and properties that I am referrring to metonymically as one or more box/carton/trunk/crate[s]. By using {lo} rather than {le}, the specification I am making is that the box must be `for real'; it cannot be just anything that I might designate as a box; the big paper bag I was looking at won't do. As for {loi tanxe}: I could be seeking one or more manifestations of `Mr. Box'. (I think {loi} is the Lojban equivalent of the TLI {lo}.) Depending on the context of me and my listener, a manifestation of `Mr. Box' may or may not be more specific that {lo}. As far as I can figure, these manifestations are usually instances of a species. Children tend to perceive, categorize, and name species-level entities, like rabbit, before they perceive, categorize, and name higher level entities, like mammal, or lower level entities, like Jack rabbit. I would convey considerable specificity if I were to say mi nitcu loi catlu I need one or more manifestations of Mr. Cat (Of course, you don't know the cat's age or sex; but if the context is is that I need a mouse-killer, the alternatives could be mouse-trap or poison.) Boxes lack a `natural', evolved form, so a manifestation of `Mr. Box' may look quite different to you than what I imagined; but manifestations of `Mr. Rabbit' and `Mr. Horse' are fairly (but not entirely) consistent around the world. Robert J. Chassell bob@gnu.ai.mit.edu 25 Rattlesnake Mountain Road bob@grackle.stockbridge.ma.us Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA (413) 298-4725