Return-Path: <@FINHUTC.HUT.FI:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from FINHUTC.hut.fi by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0r7elN-00006eC; Wed, 16 Nov 94 09:26 EET Message-Id: Received: from FINHUTC.HUT.FI by FINHUTC.hut.fi (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 4999; Wed, 16 Nov 94 09:26:53 EET Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin MAILER@SEARN) by FINHUTC.HUT.FI (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 4988; Wed, 16 Nov 1994 09:26:51 +0200 Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin LISTSERV@SEARN) by SEARN.SUNET.SE (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 2465; Wed, 16 Nov 1994 08:23:35 +0100 Date: Tue, 8 Nov 1994 10:31:56 EST Reply-To: bob@gnu.ai.mit.edu Sender: Lojban list From: bob@GNU.AI.MIT.EDU Subject: small universe consequences X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: Veijo Vilva Content-Length: 3984 Lines: 85 Here is what I am trying to say about {lo}, {le}, and the universe: In Lojban, {lo} and {le} are grammatical operators that categorize the following sumti tail as to whether it/they is/are `for real' or `that which I am designating as'. Neither categorizers, in themselves, provide specificity or definiteness. 1. You may define context for the universe of {lo}. 2. When you do this, default quantifiers are useful. 3. In certain cases, {lo} will be specific and definite. 4. The gloss of {lo} for `a' and {le} for `the' is misleading. 5. Much of the current discussion regarding specificity is misplaced. 6. Lojban is all right as is, so long as you define context, which actually is a requirement of Lojban, but sometimes overlooked. Let me lay this out: ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk cusku di'e What matters for purposes of meaning is not whether a proposition is true or false but the conditions under which it would be true or false. The meaning of the above example, then, can be defined as the set that includes every universe in which there is one grey (?) cat, and excludes every universe in which there is no grey cat. What universes actually do or don't exist isn't relevant. If every possible universe exists, then for the purposes of defining meanings, we can *pretend* that some don't. Yes, you are correct. This is what I saying, with the proviso that we can and should define the context in which we are speaking without including parts that are outside the context. (Your statement, `includes every universe', leaves open the possibility that you include universes that contain one gray cat, yet are not part of the context in which we are speaking.) (Incidentally, `grey' is the common British spelling for the American `gray'; I myself can never remember which is for which country and have to look up the spelling in a dictionary.) If we say that some universes don't exist, then it is meaningful and useful to say that .i pa lo ci mlatu cu grusi One of the three cats is gray. and be referring to a universe in which there are only three cats. I keep coming back to this because otherwise I find myself feeding many neighboring cats. :-) Returning to the point, you cannot specify or make definite the meaning of {lo mlatu} unless you constrain the universe. Jorge is correct in saying that if you do not constrain the universe, {lo} is useless. Of course, as soon as you admit the possibility of pretending that a universe or part of the universe does not exist, then you may define your context as you wish. That is how we get to universes that contain only three cats or three dogs. After all, there is nothing that says we must use the universe `as known by JCB on the day he first invented Loglan', or `as known by my gray cat', or `as was imagined by everyone on 1 November 1984'. Once you return {lo} to usefulness, with defaults {su'o} and {ro} (and actual quantifiers as spoken), then you discover that an expression containing {lo} may be specific in the mind of the speaker and definite in the mind of the listener as to which `for real' entity you are referring. Then the gloss of {lo} for `a' and {le} for `the' is seen as no more than a gloss, and a misleading one at that. Then the whole discussion of whether {lo} and {le} expressions are intrinsically + or - specific and definite is seen as misplaced. Then we come to the conclusion, in Lojban, that {lo} and {le} are grammatical operators that categorize the following sumti tail as to whether the sumti tail is `for real' or is `that which I am designating as'. Neither categorizers, in themselves, provide specificity or definiteness, although as a rule of thumb, {lo} does less and {le} does more (whence the origin of the gloss). Robert J. Chassell bob@grackle.stockbridge.ma.us 25 Rattlesnake Mountain Road bob@gnu.ai.mit.edu Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA (413) 298-4725