Message-Id: <m0rH65c-00007DC@xiron.pc.helsinki.fi>
Date:         Mon, 12 Dec 1994 00:24:10 -0800
Reply-To:     Gerald Koenig <jlk@NETCOM.COM>
Sender:       Lojban list <LOJBAN%CUVMB.bitnet@FINHUTC.hut.fi>
From:         Gerald Koenig <jlk@NETCOM.COM>
Subject:      Cowan's sum: any
To:           Veijo Vilva <veion@XIRON.PC.HELSINKI.FI>
Content-Length: 1997
Lines: 42

djan said:

>The need for "any"s comes up when we have some kind of opaque context,
>including an imperative; invariably (I claim) this involves a subordinated
>abstraction clause.

Since "any" as xe'o, means one taken from a set of at least two, and
"any" also means "some taken indiscrimminately" from a set (Webster);
there does exist a subordinate clause to the effect that the thing
selected, x, is a member of some set S, which is the extension of some
implicit subordinate clause which defines the set. Example:

I want any (xe'o) sandwich: The any selects from a set of at least two
sandwiches in the universe of discourse, such as the menu.  So the full
statement is: I want any sandwich (that is a sandwich on the menu).
The set is {all the sandwiches on the menu}.

However, if "I want any sandwich" means "I want a sandwich" then it need
not involve selection from any set, and has no implicit subordinate
clause.

So I do agree with djan's statement that "any" carries with it an
implicit subordinate clause *in the case* where "any" selects from a
set, that is xe'o and where more than one is selected. I disagree in
the case where "any" is taken to mean "a" and "a" means one, and there
is only one in the universe of discourse: A case where you say to your
wife, "I want any sandwich you have", and she says, "There's one
in the refrigerator.", and you say,"I'll take it". It is not
necessary to assume anything about the existence of a class of
sandwiches in this case; or any other subordinate clause.  It's just
first order object talk. "Any" here has been taken to mean one, with no
reference to selection from a set.

Quine quote of the day:

"The bulk of logical reasoning takes place on a level which does not
presuppose abstract entities. ...I consider it a defect in an
all-purpose formulation of the theory of reference if it represents us
as referring to abstract entities from the very beginning rather than
only where there is a real purpose in such reference."

djer