Received: from uga.cc.uga.edu by nfs1.digex.net with SMTP id AA22949 (5.67b8/IDA-1.5 for ); Fri, 9 Dec 1994 04:27:24 -0500 Message-Id: <199412090927.AA22949@nfs1.digex.net> Received: from UGA.CC.UGA.EDU by uga.cc.uga.edu (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 9562; Fri, 09 Dec 94 04:27:16 EST Received: from UGA.CC.UGA.EDU (NJE origin LISTSERV@UGA) by UGA.CC.UGA.EDU (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 9879; Fri, 9 Dec 1994 04:26:57 -0500 Date: Thu, 8 Dec 1994 13:18:10 -0700 Reply-To: Chris Bogart Sender: Lojban list From: Chris Bogart Subject: Re: reply: (1) veridicality; (2) plurality To: Bob LeChevalier Status: RO X-From-Space-Date: Fri Dec 9 04:27:28 1994 X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN%CUVMB.BITNET@uga.cc.uga.edu And says: >Returning to "the king of France is bald", referring to entity A. >I see no reason to stop believing that English grammar derives from this >phrase the following: > Ex x is king of France & x=A & x/A is bald But in Lojbab's and my proposed contexts (a play or a mental hospital), the phrase "the king of france" is used to refer to real people (a character in a play, a mental patient). The speaker and the listener both know this. They also both know the referrent isn't actually the king of France. Thus it's a "reference" (speaker and listener know what's being referred to, even if you claim not to :-)) but it's not "veridicial", and they both know that too. If this is not a "non-veridicial reference" then I'm afraid I don't know what the term means (which is a distinct possibility!) >But the truth or falsity makes little difference to the communicative >efficacy of an utterance. Considering truth is a method employed by >some semanticists, not by speakers and addressees. I disagree. If the character/patient in our examples was in fact *not* bald, the addressees would have objected. Semantics is about the meanings of utterances, and meaning has to to with what's been communicated. If A tells B, using sentence S, that C is bald, and C is in fact bald, then it's the semanticist's job to analyze S and see how it communicated the fact, not to assign an independent and arbitrary truth value to S and claim that A and B are uninterested in the truth. You're defining "truth" in an odd way that makes obviously true statements "false to semanticists". ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Chris Bogart cbogart@quetzal.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~