From LOJBAN%CUVMB.BITNET@uga.cc.uga.edu Sun Feb 26 19:41:57 1995
Message-Id: <199502270041.AA08580@nfs2.digex.net>
Date: Sun Feb 26 19:41:57 1995
From: ucleaar <ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk>
Subject:      Re: On {lo} and existence

Jorge:
> > >        mi senva lo ninmu no'u mi
> > >        ije  mi nanmu
> > >        i seni'ibo lo ninmu cu nanmu
> > It can't be true in this world, but there might be some world in which
> > this could be true.
> It is true in this world. Each of the three sentences
> (with your interpretation of {lo}) can be true in this world.

Right.

> > The process is analogous to deciding whether {le nanmu cu ninmu}
> > is true. First the hearer must ascertain who {le nanmu} refers to.
> Exactly. What you suggest in practice is that {lo} is nonspecific
> nonveridical. I think that goes against the canon.

I don't see why it's nonveridical. On the contrary: {lo broda} makes
an implicit claim that the referent really is a broda, rather than
merely being described as such.

> > That is, in this real world I can truthfully say "I described
> > my wings".
> Meaning "I said that I have wings"?

No. Meaning something like "I said my wings are white", or suchlike.

> That smells of sumti raising.

Maybe "I drew-a-picture-of my wings" is a clearer example.

> Can you write "I described my wings" using predicate logic?

 In universe U Ex is my wings, & in universe R I described x
 In universe U Ex is my wings, & in universe R I drew-a-pic-of x

> > > You can't say "I don't have wings, but they are very pretty".
> > That's right. It's only certain things like describees that don't
> > have to exist in the same universe as the universe in which the
> > main predication obtains.
> I think that's sumti raising in disguise.

You may be right. How would you unraise draw-a-pic-of?

> Does {mi skicu lo mi nelci} entail {mi skicu da}?
> Then what is the answer to {mi skicu da poi mo}?

I think it must entail {mi skicu da}. The answer to {mo} would
have to be "broda in universe U", or "se skicu in universe R".

> > > > If they can't both be true, then {lo nu} must denote something
> > > > that really happens. That would be very inconvenient.
> > > Unless {nu <bridi>} means "x1 is a potential event of <bridi>".
> > > Potential in R, independently of whether it happens or not in some U.
> > You'd have to explain to me how one ascertains whether something
> > is potential.
> For every <bridi>, {da poi nu <bridi>} is defined as a potential event.
> A potential event can happen, in which case it is an actual event,
> or never happen, in which case it remains a potential event only.
> (I don't like to define {nu} this way, I'm just trying to justify
> it's use for irrealis events).

How do I ascertain whether something is a potential event if it is of
the never-happening variety?

> > > But I agree that {lo nu} should denote something that really happens.
> > > Unfortunately, usage probably will decide against that.
> > This, you will realize, is why I, having originally taken the same
> > position as you, have elected to support the opposing view.
> My problem is with your extension of this inconvenience to objects.
> To let {lo nu klama} be an event that never happens is bad enough,
> but to let {lo mlatu} be something that is never a cat is too much
> for me.

"Never" in this universe. Not in other universes.

What you call an extension of an inconvience, I call transforming
inconsistency into consistency. The alternative route to consistency
is to require {dahi} for nu that don't necessarily ever happen. Or
we can let the inconsitency stand, with {nu} by default exceptionally
being {dahi nu}, and all other selbri defaulting to {dahinai broda}.
Any of these three is okay by me.

---
And