Return-Path: <@FINHUTC.HUT.FI:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from FINHUTC.hut.fi by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0riibF-00001pC; Sun, 26 Feb 95 15:01 EET Message-Id: Received: from FINHUTC.HUT.FI by FINHUTC.hut.fi (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 8457; Sun, 26 Feb 95 15:01:41 EET Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin MAILER@SEARN) by FINHUTC.HUT.FI (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 8455; Sun, 26 Feb 1995 15:01:41 +0200 Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin LISTSERV@SEARN) by SEARN.SUNET.SE (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 5263; Sun, 26 Feb 1995 13:57:47 +0100 Date: Sun, 26 Feb 1995 12:59:31 +0000 Reply-To: ucleaar Sender: Lojban list From: ucleaar Subject: Re: On {lo} and existence X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: Veijo Vilva In-Reply-To: (Your message of Sat, 25 Feb 95 14:38:53 EST.) Content-Length: 5071 Lines: 121 Jorge: > > I don't understand. Suppose I dream that I'm a woman. Then > > it is true that {lo ninmu cu nanmu} right? > > Only if in the dream there is a woman that is a man, and this is > > possible in the dream world. > Everything is possible in the dream world, so that is not a restriction, It depends on the dream world. In some dream worlds not everything is possible. > but anyway, this is what I meant: > mi senva lo ninmu no'u mi > ije mi nanmu > i seni'ibo lo ninmu cu nanmu It can't be true in this world, but there might be some world in which this could be true. > > Well, it needn't be false. Here's why. > > This is what I'm claiming {ro broda cu broda} entails: > > U [an in-mind constant] is a universe. In U there is a set, s. > > For every x, if, in U, x is a broda, then x is a member of s. > > R [an in-mind constant] is what we are currently taking to be > > the real universe. > > In R, very member of x is a broda. > > If U = R, then {ro broda cu broda} is true. > So we must be able to read minds in order to know whether > {ro broda cu broda} is true? How do I know if you are taking > U = R or not? The process is analogous to deciding whether {le nanmu cu ninmu} is true. First the hearer must ascertain who {le nanmu} refers to. In other words, {lo broda} means "there is something that in a certain [+specific] universe is a broda". > Would you say that {ro mlatu cu mlatu} is true or not? > Under your interpretation, it is impossible to know unless > the speaker tells us from what universe are his cats of > {ro mlatu}. In fact, the speaker could say {no mlatu cu mlatu} > and it could be true with your interpretation. This is correct. > > Let's look at your proof: > > > For the broda under consideration, find a ko'a such that > > > {ko'a broda} is false. > > Okay. Koha = me, AR. Broda = ninmu. > > > Now imagine a universe where {ko'a broda} is true. > > Ok. Recalling dreams of confused adolescence.... > > > Then {ro broda cu broda} must be false, because there is at > > > least one {lo broda}, namely ko'a, which na broda. > > {ro ninmu cu ninmu} can be true in both real world and this > > dream world where I'm a ninmu, so long as the universe in which > > the membership of the set containing lahe {ro ninmu} is the > > same as the universe in which these members are ninmu. I.e. if > > universe U is universe R. > But we are considering the case where U is not the same as R. > U is the dream where you are a ninmu. Then clearly in this > universe R, {ro ninmu cu ninmu} is false. With this U, it is indeed false. But the point is that not every duhu derived from this seduhu need be false, or true. > The question is, how do we know whether {ro ninmu cu ninmu} is true > or false? Do we only examine R, or do we have to additionally > ask the speaker to tell us what U is? If the latter, then no > truth values of statements involving {lo} can be decided by anyone > but the speaker. We must know what U is, if we want to know whether {ro ninmu cu ninmu}, or anything else with a {lo} in, is true. The matter of how we know what U is is a separate issue: the hearer may know from context what it is, or may ask the speaker. As I said above, this is how +specifics work. > > I see what you're saying. The problem comes from taking {lo broda} > > to mean: > > Ex, x is a universe, and in x, Ey, y is a broda > > - according to which everything you say is true, whereas I think it > > should mean: > > In universe U, Ey, y is a broda. > > - in which case, to test whether {lo broda cu brode} is true, you > > first have to ascertain which universe is U. > So you agree that no statement involving {lo} has a truth value other > than the one the speaker chooses. Not at all. The speaker doesn't choose the truth value. The truth value depends on the state of certain universes. > > "I described my wings" doesn't entail "I have wings". > It does in English. To be more precise, in English "I described my wings" does not entail "In the world where I described my wings, I have wings". That is, in this real world I can truthfully say "I described my wings". > If you say "My wings are yellow with purple dots" I will ask > "You have wings???". You can't say "I don't have wings, but > they are very pretty". That's right. It's only certain things like describees that don't have to exist in the same universe as the universe in which the main predication obtains. > > If they can't both be true, then {lo nu} must denote something > > that really happens. That would be very inconvenient. > Unless {nu } means "x1 is a potential event of ". > Potential in R, independently of whether it happens or not in some U. You'd have to explain to me how one ascertains whether something is potential. > But I agree that {lo nu} should denote something that really happens. > Unfortunately, usage probably will decide against that. This, you will realize, is why I, having originally taken the same position as you, have elected to support the opposing view. --- And