Return-Path: <@FINHUTC.HUT.FI:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from FINHUTC.hut.fi by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0rmSrO-00007ZC; Wed, 8 Mar 95 23:01 EET Message-Id: Received: from FINHUTC.HUT.FI by FINHUTC.hut.fi (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 1027; Wed, 08 Mar 95 23:01:48 EET Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin MAILER@SEARN) by FINHUTC.HUT.FI (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 1023; Wed, 8 Mar 1995 23:01:40 +0200 Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin LISTSERV@SEARN) by SEARN.SUNET.SE (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 3777; Wed, 8 Mar 1995 21:57:29 +0100 Date: Wed, 8 Mar 1995 12:53:29 EST Reply-To: jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU Sender: Lojban list From: jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU Subject: Re: On {lo} and existence X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: Veijo Vilva Content-Length: 2886 Lines: 68 And: > We must also bring into consideration the world that determines the > truth of a proposition. If you say S.H. is a man, and you say it of > this world, then it's false. If you say it of the fictional world > then it's true. Either way, you and your utterance remain in this > world. Are you saying that I can utter {la cerlok xolmyz cu nanmu}, and this will be either true or false depending on my intentions? I have no problem with that, as long as you agree that {da poi nanmu du la cerlok xolmyz} has the same truth value in the same circumstances. > I mean "A.R. mentioned S.H." to be a proposition rather than an > utterance. As you know, I do not believe utterances have truth-values. > Utterances are actions, like sneezing or kicking a football are. > This *proposition* is true as it applies to this world, and false > as it applies to the fictional world. Let's see if I understand the definitions: A sentence is a string of words. An utterance is an act of using a sentence. What is a proposition? Is it derived from a sentence or from an utterance? If it's derived from a sentence, then I agree that its truth value will not be determined only by the sentence. That's why it doesn't make sense to say that a sentence is true or not. If, on the other hand, it is derived from an utterance, the context is already determined, and then its truth value is also determined. Then there is no crime in saying that an utterance has a truth value, it is well defined, it's the truth value of the proposition associated with it. I was assuming that propositions were associated with utterances, not with sentences. > I take "imaginary" and "not of this universe" to be the same. This is the root of our disagreement then. In that case, I agree you can talk about things "not of this universe". But the quantifiers quantify over these without any difficulty. There's no need for any special marking at the level of quantification. The distinction, if needed, is made by a predicate, {xanri} or some such. > I do not see any basis for distinguishing between them. I agree > that every utterance refers to objects that are real or imaginary; > I don't think it could be otherwise. We agree then. > > Also, would we say that a short event is a {citno fasnu}, a "young > > event"? I don't think so. I think {citno} will only be used for > > living things or other things with "lifetimes". > > I should think not either, but because youth has to do with elapsed > duration from the perspective of some temporal reference point, > rather than with total duration. > > {citno fa le nu troci} makes sense: "the struggle is young", "the > struggle has only just begun". Example context: early in an > election campaign. Yes, that makes sense. But slabu is not the opposite of that. someone can be citno gi'e slabu, young and familiar, and there is no contradiction. Jorge