From LOJBAN%CUVMB.BITNET@uga.cc.uga.edu Wed Mar 22 16:43:41 1995
From: jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU
Date: Wed Mar 22 16:43:41 1995
Subject:      Re: On {lo} and existence
Status: RO
Message-ID: <GCIKtieGIRH.A.kiG.Zv0kLB@chain.digitalkingdom.org>

And:
> Certainly we can entertain a proposition without claiming it to be
> true.

To entertain it we need to understand the meaning of the predicate.

> > You seem to be saying that the meaning of a predicate depends on context,
> > which is very true for natlangs. I suppose it will be true for Lojban as
> > well.
>
> I don't think I'm saying this. At least not if we're using a
> truth-conditional rather than psychological model of semantics.

I'm lost again. Are there propositions independently of there being
a world (or worlds)?

Consider a simple sentence: {da blanu}. How can you associate a proposition
to it unless you know the meaning of the word "blanu"? How can this word
have meaning without there being a world out there (with real and imaginary
components) with things that satisfy the predicate or don't? You talk
of "proposition634" as if it had a referent outside the world, but to me
the world consists of all referents, so the referent of "proposition634"
cannot be outside of it, by definition of world. Are you using a more
restricted definition of "world"? How do you determine whether a referent
is or is not in the world? In your proposition true(prop23, world73, 1),
are the referents of "prop23" and "world73" in the same world?

>    There is a possibly imaginary event the occurrence of which would
>    constitute a successful outcome (by x1's standards) to x1's exertions.
>
> In this case {mi troci lo dahi nu klama} would not run into an opacity
> problem.

Yes, I see what you mean.

> At any rate, it remains clear that {nitcu}, {troci} et al. continue
> to lack adequate definitions.

Yes.

Jorge