Return-Path: <@FINHUTC.HUT.FI:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from FINHUTC.hut.fi by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0rlxAn-00007YC; Tue, 7 Mar 95 13:11 EET Message-Id: Received: from FINHUTC.HUT.FI by FINHUTC.hut.fi (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with BSMTP id 9638; Tue, 07 Mar 95 12:39:07 EET Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin MAILER@SEARN) by FINHUTC.HUT.FI (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 9636; Tue, 7 Mar 1995 12:39:07 +0200 Received: from SEARN.SUNET.SE (NJE origin LISTSERV@SEARN) by SEARN.SUNET.SE (LMail V1.2a/1.8a) with BSMTP id 7097; Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:35:09 +0100 Date: Tue, 7 Mar 1995 05:35:59 -0500 Reply-To: Logical Language Group Sender: Lojban list From: Logical Language Group Subject: truth vs. fact X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: Veijo Vilva Content-Length: 2205 Lines: 44 >> What I've been trying to >> get at is that for most predications to be true in universe X, their >> sumti must also exist in universe X. E.g.: >> >> Real Fictional >> false true Sherlock Holmes solved many crimes. > >Agreed that it is false, but not because there is no Sherlock Holmes, >since obviously there is. The name "Sherlock Holmes" has a well defined >referent, namely the fictional character that is a fictional character >in this world. It is false because it is false that characters of >fiction can solve real crimes. On the other hand, the predication >"Sherlock Holmes du Sherlock Holmes" is true, and so is "Sherlock Holmes >is a character of fiction". I disagree that it is false. If you can have a statement that includes a fictional "Sherlock Holmes", then you can have a statement that includes fictional "many crimes". I think you guys are getting hung up in the difference between "true" which has an epistemology place, and "fact", which deals only with "reality" in the absolute. Most language use is about "truth" rather than about "facts", and statements about Sherlock Holmes tend to authomaticially invoke an epistemology that incorporates fiction. It is my contention that the pragmatic mention of most fictional referents incorporates the world where that referent exists into the universe of discourse. True: Sherlock Holmes solved many crimes. False: Sherlock Holmes solved many real crimes. If "lo" can be used to make statements about fictional unicorns, then it can be used to make statements about fictional crimes. This is because "lo" descriptions refer to things that fill the indicated x1 place, i.e. they have the properties required of things that fill that place. It is part of incorporating the fiction that refers to Sherlock Holmes that he has all the properties of a man. It is a part of incorporating the fiction that refers to Sherlock Holmes that there were things he solved that - in fiction - had the properties of crimes, and therefore can be described as lo zekri. At least for most people, the default values for ellipsized x2 and x3 of zasti are such that Sherlock Holmes did not solve lo zekri poi zasti. lojbab