Return-Path: <@SEGATE.SUNET.SE:LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET> Received: from SEGATE.SUNET.SE by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0sh19n-0000ZHC; Fri, 11 Aug 95 23:58 EET DST Message-Id: Received: from segate.sunet.se by SEGATE.SUNET.SE (LSMTP for OpenVMS v0.1a) with SMTP id 6974B2A5 ; Fri, 11 Aug 1995 22:58:18 +0200 Date: Fri, 11 Aug 1995 13:16:25 -0700 Reply-To: "John E. Clifford" Sender: Lojban list From: "John E. Clifford" Subject: quantifiers X-To: lojban list To: Veijo Vilva Content-Length: 6692 Lines: 114 I see I have forgotten to "dot my tease and cross my eyes" >>6)3. What I meant was that, while A and I have existential import, E and O do not (Dodo's system and a better solution to the conflicts within the "tradition" -- all with existential import -- than the "modern" version -- only particulars have import). Negation shoving (I did not really think xorxes was concerned with duality, but that was what he said) is now a snap: not A is O, and conversely, not I is E and conversely (they are contradic tories as I said). Obversion will not allow for complete definitions, since the products have the wrong import: su'o broda naku cu brode has existential import for brodas, while xu'o (I think that was what I called it) broda cu brode does not (and conver sely for the opposite obversions and correspondingly for E and A). Contrapositives don't work either, for the same reason -- but we rarely use them anyhow (nor obverses, for that matter). Of course, this does give another way for getting importless form s and the new form is sometimes easier to deal with than the conditional form, in spite of the fact that it uses double negations of a sort: no broda cu naku brode versus ro da broda nagi'a brode (clearly cases where there are advantages are not the simp le forms). That is, given TWO non-contradictory forms (contraries, subcontraries or subalterns), we can define the other two and also all the forms with the opposite existential import: the complete range of basic quantifiers. This version of the existential import question (version six of the systematic 16) is, like all of them, a little odd. While lack of import comes naturally to E (to say that no S are P clearly is as easily satisfied by there being no S as by none that t here are being P), the usual reading of O -- Some S is not P -- seems to force existential import for S. Of course, what we often say, "Not every S is P" is a little less forceful. But xorxes proposed "all except at least one" seems to get existential im port for S without getting the requisite negative force. Indeed, it seems almost to force the "some are, some are not reading," although I expect that, in Lojban, da'a ro is legal -- and a very backward way to say no. xorxes on >pc > Actually, I would not really take 1a and 1b to mean the same as 1d > although they turn out to be true on the same occasions (assuming, > to avoid much more muddling matters, that all the brodas are in the domain > of discourse or that restriction is to a subdomain). That's what I meant by "meaning the same". I am not claiming that they would not have different connotations. What I meant was that in a logical argument I could jump from any one to the other. pc: OK. But then, since ci da poi nanmu ku ci de poi gerku zo'u da pencu de "means the same as" ci de poi gerku ku ci da poi nanmu zo'u da pencu de (and do not even have different connotations that I can think of), and since, in the latter the dog reference is clearly not in the scope of the man reference, it must not be so confined in the former either. That is, this is just the thing for the three-dog, three-men assertion. The reason that this works is because both quantifiers have been overtly separated from the matrix which joins them, pencu, which, thus, plays no part in the specification of the ranges of the quantifiers. In the simpler form, ci da poi nanmu cu pencu ci de poi gerku, the fact that the quantifiers are embedded in the matrix forces us to take the matrix even into account in defining the range of at least the dogs. Xorxes claims that this is just one way of specifying how to do it but has neither proposed an alternate way of achieving the differentiation he wants (his will not work, as noted) nor shown in what way this proposal -- which is completely general and motivated by Lojban syntax as well as logical syntax -- is inadequate nor has he proposed an alternative. The And proposal involves sets essentially -- and xorxes disapproves of them -- and -- insofar as it has been spelled out -- does not seem to differ significantly from my proposal in any other way. (I hope you, And, will jump in at this point and show that that last appearance is wrong and give details). xorxes on >pc: > In this case certainly the change is not a superficial one (as it is in > the parenthetically mentioned case) but a profound one that alters the > whole underlying structure of the sentence, syntactically and logically. If you define it like that. My point is that there is no need to. > Syntactically (one story anyhow, others are parallel) the sentence shifts > from one with a predicate (pencu) head to one with a quantification head. Yes, but that may just be two different notations for the same thing. > Logically, the scopes of the quantifiers are changed (at least -- I think > rather more is involved). The simplest definition would be that they not be changed. pc: I am not clear just where definitions come into this, once the grammar of Lojban has been set up, which was done in respense to a number of factors which have nothing to do with the present problem. The most that seems left is to say that this radical change in structure has an insignificant effect on the meaning of the sentence. Again, the cases involved here are but special instances of quite general alterations (or relationships between two structures) and I think it can be demonstrated that the general rules under which these fall have generally significant effects on meaning. So, what xorxes really needs at this point is a reason why these few cases should be exceptions. The simplest case is to follow the general rule, not introduce an exception. All of this does make me long again for referential expressions, which do spare us all the scoping problems of quantifiers. sos: > xorxes: > I would read it as "there are exactly two men for which there are > exactly two dogs such that...", i.e. for each of the men. > pc: > I do not see why you want to read the "for which" in there, since it is > not in there. To make the English clearer pc: Why not just use "and," which isn't there either but makes the English clearer without introducing an extraneous element of subordination? xorxes: [I]t is a matter of definition which notation expresses which claim. pc: I am not sure that I agree, but if it is, then let us agree to take a nice simple form -- only appropriately more complex than the simplest one for the simplest case -- and use it for the other related case. Again I offer the prenex form, which is about t he right size and is at least free from obvious defects under existing and independently motivated rules. pc>|83