Return-Path: Received: from SEGATE.SUNET.SE by xiron.pc.helsinki.fi with smtp (Linux Smail3.1.28.1 #1) id m0tK7yI-0000ZWC; Mon, 27 Nov 95 20:08 EET Message-Id: Received: from listmail.sunet.se by SEGATE.SUNET.SE (LSMTP for OpenVMS v1.0a) with SMTP id 255D4061 ; Mon, 27 Nov 1995 19:08:06 +0100 Date: Mon, 27 Nov 1995 12:38:53 -0501 Reply-To: "Robert J. Chassell" Sender: Lojban list From: "Robert J. Chassell" Subject: Guttman scales/Certainty Factors [long, hard] 3 of 4 X-To: lojban@cuvmb.bitnet To: Veijo Vilva Content-Length: 5898 Lines: 140 This is the 3rd of 4 related messages. Here is an example of `certainty factors' as an interval scale. This message follows after, and is best understood, within the context of two other messages I just posted, called `Guttman Scales' and `Guttman scales examples' Now, I know full well that it is hard to translate from English to Lojban; but would one of you experts out there care to translate this? You would get a chance to work with numbers and equations, and other things we are telling new comers not to bother with. :) (I don't know whether I could translate this if I had the time--I might not be able to. I just ran this through the Unix `style' program and it tells me that this is readable at the 10th through 13th grade level --- this is considerably harder to follow than my usual writing, which is aimed at the 9th and 10th grade level, a level that is easy and comfortable for readers who went to college.) Certainty Factor example ........................ In the mid 1980s, David McAllister, at MIT, developed a metric for `certainty factors' for use in an `expert system' (a type of computer program). This example will give you a sense of what can be done with an interval scale when you cannot make ratios. Metrics of this sort will become more commonplace in the years ahead, not only in diagnosing problems with oil refineries and illnesses in people, but also in mortgage lending and mutual fund investment. A certainty factor is used to express how accurate, truthful, or reliable you judge a predicate to be. It is your judgement of how good your evidence is. The issue is how to combine various judgements. Note that a certainty factor is neither a probability nor a truth value. Consider the expression `George is suffering from hypoxia'. Based on warnings given to pilots, we would speak of there being `strongly suggestive evidence' that George is suffering from hypoxia when he is flying in an unpressurized airplane at 12,000 feet and his judgement, memory, altertness, and coordination are off. Note, we are not saying "there is an eighty percent chance that George suffers hypoxia"; that is a probability estimate. We are talking about our judgement of certainty. You may be able to generate statements of probability, such as: "80% of US Air Force student pilots will fail to maintain altitude within 100 feet when they fly higher than... feet without supplementary oxygen, and this will indicate they suffer from hypoxia." But this is a different sort of statement than one involving certainty factors. What I am doing is in this example of uncertainty is taking what I was taught as a student pilot and creating from that information a mechanism for diagnosing hypoxia. I don't know the probability that a person of my health and age will suffer hypoxia at 12,000 feet, but I do know the symptoms, which, however, may be weak, or have other causes. In McAllister's scheme, a certainty factor is a number from 0.0 to 1.0. A phrase such as `suggestive evidence' is given a number such as 0.6; `strongly suggestive evidence' is given a number such as 0.8. The person making the judgement uses the scale more or less as an ordinal scale. The numbers are used in a metric to permit a computer to make calculations. McAllister's rules for combining certainty factors are such that you can add new evidence to existing evidence. If the evidence is positive, this increases your certainty, as you would expect. But you never become 100% certain. Continuing our hypoxia example: George tells us that he feels wonderful. This is `suggestive evidence' that George suffers from hypoxia. (Pilots are warned of this: "if you feel euphoric, consider hypoxia: you may be flying too high without oxygen, or suffering carbon monoxide poisoning from a broken heater." Of course, there are many good reasons to become euphoric when you fly; hypoxia is insidiously dangerous.) McAllister defined the rule for adding two positive certainty factors like this: CFcombine (CFa CFb) = CFa + CFb(1 - Cfa) I.e., reduce the influence of the second certainty factor by the remaining uncertainty of the first, and add the result to the certainty of the first. In our example, the altitude and loss of judgment are strongly suggestive evidence, with a certainty factor of 0.8; and euphoria is suggestive evidence, with a certainty factor of 0.8. The combined certainty factor is: .92 = .6 + .8(1 - .6) (Incidentally, it does not matter which factor you start with first: .8 + .6(1 - .8) = .6 + .8(1 - .6) = .92 Both sequences produce the same result.) McAllister also has rules for adding two negative certainties, and for adding a positive and a negative certainty. A negative certainty is the degree to which you are certain the case is not so. The rule for adding two negative certainties is simple: Treat the two factors as positive and negate the result CFcombine (CFe CFf) = -(CFcombine (-CFe -CFf)) The rule for adding positive and negative certainty factors is more complex: CFcombine (CFg CFh) = (CFg + CFh) / (1 - min{|CFg|, |CFn|}) Thus if your certainty for an instance is 0.88 and your certainty factor against it is 0.90, the result is: -.17 = (.88 - -.90) / (1 - min(.88, .90)) = -.02 / .12 I.e. take the difference, and then multiply that value by the reciprocal of the smallest remaining uncertainty. These three rules provide an interval scale for certainty factors. You will note that you cannot say that a certainty factor of 0.8 is twice the certainty of 0.4; the rules of this metric only involve those of addition and subtraction that I have shown, no others. Robert J. Chassell bob@gnu.ai.mit.edu 25 Rattlesnake Mountain Road bob@rattlesnake.com Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA (413) 298-4725