From LOJBAN%CUVMB.BITNET@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU Sun Dec 10 11:02:53 1995 Reply-To: ucleaar Date: Sun Dec 10 11:02:53 1995 Sender: Lojban list From: ucleaar Subject: Re: TECH: lambda and "ka" revisited X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan Status: OR Message-ID: lui la djan ce mi luu goi koa zou ge cusku be die gi casnu vau fa le girzu be koa: > > > Lojban ontology is such that there exist certain objects, called > > > "abstract objects", which can have various things predicated of > > > them. The abstract objects called "events" can each have a "nu...kei" > > > predicated of them; in fact, they are called into existence because > > > of the "nu...kei" predicates. (To be is to be the value of a variable: > > > so "da poi nu ... kei" says "there exists an event abstract object ...") > > They seem like sets and bridi then. > Well, no. Sets have properties like cardinality and membership; event > abstract objects do not. They have properties like occurring-ism, > desirability, destroying (of something), being early (by some std), etc. I mean they're like sets and bridi because either they all exist or they all don't exist. You don't need to inspect the world to find out. > As for bridi, they are du'u-class objects, I think: intensions. > (That's "lo bridi", not the English word "bridi" which primarily refers > to a linguistic object. Maybe I should change "bridi" to "briju'a" > everywhere in the reference grammar?) Yes, and sumti should be changed too. Brijua isn't ideal, because one tends to think of jufra as things bounded by {i} whereas the canonical valsi be lo bridi is the contents of duu...kei. But {brivla} is already taken. You could use {selvla} too, instead of "referent", which is used a bit more laxly than some (not me) might like. > > > However, the gismu "fasnu" is true only of such event abstract objects > > > as actually occur. So "da poi nu la .ualas co'eli'o kei zo'u da fasnu" > > > is false because Wallace wasn't President, but the abstract object > > > encoding "Wallace was President" still exists, and we can say things > > > about it other than "da fasnu". This does not mean that "da" can refer > > > to a nonexistent object (there are no nonexistent objects); it means that > > > it can refer to abstract objects which encapsulate non-occurring events. > > I'm still rather unhappy about having eventy abstract objects but not > > appley abstract objects and forky abstract objects and so on. > These are "le su'u ... kei be lo plise/forca". Arguably, the x2 of > "su'u" should be "lo ka" rather than just "lo". What would go within the suu...kei? Nothing? Is {le suu kei be lo ka kea plise} how you talk about abstract apples? > Whereas sets must be abstract, because they have no empirical > correlates, events and forks are concrete (in the sense of being > observable). > Forks are concrete: I can point to them, pick them up, etc. Event > abstract objects are not. Events can be pointed to, albeit not picked up. Event abstract objects and fork abstract objects can be pointed to if they're real; the fork abstract object, if real, can also be picked up. > As to observability, the gismu list is silent on whether the x2 of > "zgana" (the observed) is an event or a concrete object. There isn't such a dichotomy. > I suspect that concrete objects are meant. I suspect that physically manifest things (including events and forks) are meant. > So > 1) do zgana le nu mi klama le zarci > is false, whereas > 2) do zgana mi poi klama le zarci > is true. I reckon most users would wish to disagree with you on this. > > Events and forks can be either real or imaginable, whereas for sets > > reality and imaginability amount to the same thing. > I again disagree, but from the other side now. I can imagine the set > of all sets ("lo'i girzu"), but Cantor's paradox guarantees its > nonexistence. Should that be {lohi se girzu}? I had an idea that x1 of girzu is the group and x2 is the set of its members. But my gismu list has "x1 is group/set defined by property (ka)/membership (set) x3", which is stange both in the absence of x2 and in the "group/set" gloss. As for Cantor's paradox, it is metaphysically curious. lohi girzu exists in the world of the imaginable, and no sets (or all sets) exist in the world of the real. I'll go off and revise my metaphysics. Maybe you can't imagine the set of all sets - rather, you can imagine a method of generating it (which wouldn't work). --- And