Date: Tue, 28 Oct 1997 11:12:01 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199710281612.LAA03953@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: bob@rattlesnake.com Sender: Lojban list From: bob@MEGALITH.RATTLESNAKE.COM Subject: Re: Dvorak (& Lojban) To: c9709244@alinga.newcastle.edu.au Cc: lojban@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU In-Reply-To: (message from HACKER G N on Tue, 28 Oct 1997 12:28:54 +1100 (EST)) X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 1632 Lines: 34 ... because the former implies that you don't have in mind a specific cat, which "lo" clearly dictates. ... I know we have discussed this too much in the past, so I won't get into this, except to note that you are expanding your universe of reference more than is warranted. I have a friend who has two cats and two tiny dogs. When one cat and one dog are in the room and she says {le mlatu} I have not the foggiest idea to which animal she is referring. But when she says {lo mlatu}, I know she is referring to the specific cat that is in the room. This is because of the pragmatic way she handles context. When she is saying `that which I designate' the designated entity is likely to be somewhat like a similar real entity, but not necessarily be the real entity. However, she hardly ever makes reference to objects outside the current context without warning me first. So, when she refers to {that which is really a cat}, I don't expect her to be referring to any real cat in the universe, but to the real cat in the context of the conversation. Of course, when she has expanded the context to include the whole universe, then `real cat' is unspecified. Under these circumstances, you are quite right. But these are not the circumstances. Many logicians always presume that the context is bigger than their interlocutor expects. I am not a logician, nor are most of the people with whom I have conversations. -- Robert J. Chassell bob@rattlesnake.com 25 Rattlesnake Mountain Road bob@ai.mit.edu Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA (413) 298-4725