Date: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 21:56:20 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199710280256.VAA09302@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: HACKER G N Sender: Lojban list From: HACKER G N Subject: Re: SWH again (was Re: What's going on here?) X-To: Lojban List To: John Cowan In-Reply-To: <0EIP00IMUZEAD6@mail.newcastle.edu.au> X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 3409 Lines: 62 On Sun, 26 Oct 1997, Edward Cherlin wrote: > At 1:16 PM -0700 10/25/97, Chris Bogart wrote: > >On Sun, 26 Oct 1997, HACKER G N wrote: > [snip] > > >> But in terms of actually making the distinction at all, you don't need a > >> language to do that, you just make the distinction. What a language can do > >> is find a convenient way of expressing that distinction to others. > > > >For me at least, though, it could help me think about the matter more > >smoothly, and therefore more quickly or more often, at least within a > >certain category of thinking. > > > >This is all very theoretical -- I have no idea how I could ever prove this > >to myself for sure, much less anyone else. But I suppose that's an > >inherent problem when discussing something as immeasurable as "thought". > > A practical example is Conway's recent recasting of the theory of games in > terms of extended non-standard arithmetic. A number is defined as an > ordered pair of sets of numbers, where each member of the Left set is less > than each member of the Right set. A game is an ordered pair of sets of > games, without restriction. Both constructions begin with the number 0 = { > | } in which both Left and Right sets are empty. Then { 0 | } is a number > (1), { 0 | 1 } is a number (1/2), and { 0 | 0 } is a game (*). This game * > is infinitesimal, and neither greater than 0, less than 0, or equal to 0. > > Using this theory, Elwyn Berlekamp, a middle-level amateur, is able to > create Go positions in which he can routinely beat the top players in the > world with either color. He thinks in the new language (up, star, tiny, > miny...), they think in the traditional language of Go (sente, gote...) and > he wins, over and over. > > The concepts cannot be explained in the old terminology, and the > distinctions cannot be made without the new terminology. You can think of > making one distinction at a time without new language, but not the hundreds > required to use the new theory of Go endgames. See "Mathematical Go > Endgames: Nightmares for Professional Go Players" by Berlekamp and Wolfe, > for details. ISBN 0-923891-36-6. There is also a hardcover edition under > the title, "Mathematical Go: Chilling Gets the Last Point". > > Other practical cases of great interest are recounted by Oliver Sachs in > "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat." The most interesting for this > discussion is the artist with achromatopsia. Due to neurological damage, he > lost not only the ability to see colors, but all memory of what colors > looked like. He could still describe colors by name and by Pantone matching > number. It turned out, however, that his knowledge of color went no further > than names and numbers. All the rest of his understanding of color was > lost. > > The point is that language by itself does not provide the means for > thought. Language and other mental abilities have to work together so that > the language refers to something--a memory, a mental model, or whatever, > which we hope is connected to reality--and the user can work in the > language or the concepts or both, whichever is more appropriate at the > moment. This seems a well-balanced view. So there is thought which is more language-oriented and thought that is more concept-oriented, and you switch from one to the other as need be. Fair enough. Geoff