Message-Id: <199710030102.UAA17721@locke.ccil.org>
Reply-To: JORGE JOAQUIN LLAMBIAS <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>
Date: Thu Oct  2 20:03:07 1997
Sender: Lojban list <LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET>
From: JORGE JOAQUIN LLAMBIAS <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>
Subject:      Re: LE and VOI
X-To:         lojban <lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu>
To: John Cowan <cowan@LOCKE.CCIL.ORG>
X-Mozilla-Status: 0011
Content-Length: 1169
X-From-Space-Date: Thu Oct  2 20:03:07 1997
X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU

And:
>Consider "There's going to be a brilliant film on the telly
>tomorrow". That can be interpreted nonspecifically, e.g. if
>I know that the network always schedules brillliant films
>for Fridays. Or it can be interpreted specifically, e.g. if
>I know that Barry Lyndon is going to be shown. If the hearer
>understands it as specific, they may ask "Which one?", but
>would not ask such a question if they assume a nonspecific
>interpretation.

All right, yes, I think I understand it now. As you said a couple
of posts ago, it's the difference between:

 (a)           There's a brilliant film such that I assert it is going to be
                 on the telly tomorrow.

and

(b)            I assert that there's going to be a brilliant film on the
                 telly tomorrow.

We can easily say (b) using {lo}:

                 lo xautce skina ba se tivni ca le bavlamdei

but we don't have a direct  way of saying (a) unless we go for
something like:

    lo xautce skina zo'u mi xusra le du'u sy ba se tivni ca le bavlamdei

I'd say that even this should work:

           lo xautce skina zo'u ju'a sy ba se tivni ca le bavlamdei

Very interesting.

Jorge