Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 01:40:57 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199711260640.BAA14067@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: Edward Cherlin Sender: Lojban list From: Edward Cherlin Subject: Re: Events & sisku [was: le/lo] X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan In-Reply-To: <199711170644.WAA05505@unagi.cybernothing.org> X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 1504 X-From-Space-Date: Wed Nov 26 01:41:18 1997 X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU At 11:43 PM -0700 11/16/97, Logical Language Group wrote: [snip] >It is most certainly the case that "nu" does not claim occurance. "fasnu" >is the predicate that claims actual or potential occurance, and takes a >"nu" predication as x1. But in my mind, a nu predication need not even >be a potential event, though perhaps it has to be a conceivable event. [snip] There are inconceivable events which can be described, and others which are only nameable at best. Zen Kensho is a nameable event which is only described as 'indescribable', and is certainly inconceivable to those who haven't experienced it. More so than color to a blind person, apparently. Now, consider any of the subsets of the natural numbers which has no defining predicate (in some suitable first-order language and theory in which all recursive predicates can be expressed). The set as a whole has a defining predicate only in a second-order theory. It is uncountable, but we cannot point to a single member. There is a model of the second-order theory in which this set is modelled by the empty set. Many people find it inconceivable that the empty set can model an uncountable set, but that's math. There are other ontologies in which rather more bizarre possibilities for events and such arise. Try the "Many Worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, for example. Ed Cherlin, President, CAUCE "Everything should be made as simple as possible, __but no simpler__." Attributed to Albert Einstein