Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 09:23:09 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199712131423.JAA18296@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: JORGE JOAQUIN LLAMBIAS Sender: Lojban list From: JORGE JOAQUIN LLAMBIAS Subject: Re: ka'e X-To: lojban To: John Cowan Status: OR X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 2850 X-From-Space-Date: Sat Dec 13 09:23:11 1997 X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU >>>We would not say that "lo remna ka'e vofli" even if we >>>define that what someone does in an airplane or even more limitedly, a >>>human propelled airplane is "flying". > >As with most such cases, the ellipsized x2 has some value less > releavnt to the claim, which is consistent with the predication being true. > In the case of this example, x2 is probably "da". So why would we not say {lo remna ka'e vofli} meaning that {lo remna ka'e vofli lo vinji}? >>I'm not comfortable with the concept of innateness. > >I think it is not a particularly "Western" concept. What makes me uncomfortable is its seemeingly extreme subjectivity. >>Is a >>sidewalk innately walkable by ants, for example? > >Yes. and indeed most surfaces can be described as innately walkable. >Butthere are exceptions (surface of the sun, of a cell wall, a frictionless >surface). Innately walkable by ants, you mean? Because most walls are not innately walkable by humans, I would say. Or consider the surface of the Moon. If {lo remna ka'e vofli lo vinji} is false, then {lo remna ka'e cadzu le lunra sefta} must be false as well. And if making human fly is not an innate property of planes, then I don't know what is. >>The problem is how do you decide whether a relationship holds >>"by nature" or by some other reason. > >I think that to answer this we have to get used to thinking of properties of >predications (loi ka broda) instead of properties of sumti. As an aside, {loi ka broda} are properties of predications only when broda is a selbri that accepts a predication as one of its arguments. For example: {le ka ce'u jetnu} "being true", {le ka djuno ce'u}, "being known", etc. >It seems clear to >me that those properties we use to determine the truth of a bridi are loi >ka bridi, and are the innate properties of the bridi. The properties of being a bridi? {lo remna ka'e vofli lo vinji} has the property of being a bridi. How do you use that property to determine the truth of the bridi? >Now it seems that if a bridi would hold except for the value of one sumti >(it would hold with some specific na'ebo le sumti, then we would ascribe the >flaw in the bridi to that sumti. I've no idea what you're getting at, but let's see if I understand what you're saying. Consider {mi klama le zarci}. Now, let's say it is John, not me, who goes to the market, and that I go to the park. So what is the flaw of the bridi, is it {mi} because it should be {la djan}, or is it {le zarci}, because it should be {le panka}? > If in turn that particular sumti, out of all >the sumti of its "kind" makes the bridi false, while others of the kind make >it true, then we would see the referent of that sumti as failing to uphold >the innate properties of the typical member of that type. I don't understand. Could you give examples, please? co'o mi'e xorxes