Date:  Wed, 31 Dec 1997 13:32:24 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <199712311832.NAA07117@locke.ccil.org>
Reply-To: Ashley Yakeley <AshleyB@HALCYON.COM>
Sender: Lojban list <LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET>
From: Ashley Yakeley <AshleyB@HALCYON.COM>
Subject:      Re: Knowledge & Belief
X-To:         Lojban List <LOJBAN@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu>
To: John Cowan <cowan@LOCKE.CCIL.ORG>
Status: OR
X-Mozilla-Status: 0011
Content-Length: 897
X-From-Space-Date: Wed Dec 31 13:32:25 1997
X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU

At 1997-12-31 09:13, Steven Belknap wrote:

><la stivn djuno le du'u la xorxes djuno le du'u la lojbab klama le zarci
>kei fo da>
>
>"Steven knows that Jorge knows that Lojbab goes to the store."
>
>The above statement is always false, which considerably limits its utility.
>I am asserting that it is not possible to directly know that some else
>knows something.

Are you drawing a distinction between 'know' and 'directly know'? It what
sense is it not possible to know that someone else knows something, but
it is possible to know that someone else does something? Bear in mind
that in both cases, 'knowledge' is mediated through imperfect senses.

In any case, your definition of 'know' is at variance with the standard
one, with which it certainly is possible to "know" that someone knows
something. Go ask anyone on the street.


--
fe'oca'emi'e tricrfraksizeicecmu .iji'a ca'emi'e .aclin.