Date: Tue, 9 Dec 1997 11:06:24 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199712091606.LAA24232@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: bob@rattlesnake.com Sender: Lojban list From: bob@MEGALITH.RATTLESNAKE.COM Subject: Re: cold logic X-To: lojban@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU To: John Cowan In-Reply-To: <3.0.2.32.19971209134034.0069a498@mugla.bcc.bilkent.edu.tr> (message from Robin Turner on Tue, 09 Dec 1997 13:40:34 +0200) X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 4542 X-From-Space-Date: Tue Dec 9 11:06:38 1997 X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU wrote: As far as I know, the Lakoff-Johnson model does not overtly distinguish between metaphors such as EMOTIONS ARE WARM, which follow more-or-less automatically from image-schematic universals, and those which have culture-specific preconditions, such as TIME IS MONEY (obviously meaningless in a culture which does not have money). Good point. Interestingly, it might be possible to begin to distangle these using Anna Wierzbicka's work. Wierzbicka's thesis, which Lakoff says is interesting, but with which he disagrees, is that there are a small number of universal concepts: I, you, someone, something, this, say, want, don't want (or `no'), feel, think; know, where, good; when, can, like, the same, kind of, after, do, happen, bad, all, because, if, two; part, become, imagine, world Culture specific concepts, such as `soul' and `courage', use these universal concepts differently in various cultures. For example, one of three definitions of `soul', using only these concepts: soul (definition 1, often contempory American) one of two parts of a person one cannot see it it is part of another world good beings are part of that world things are not part of that world because of this part a person can be a good person The research project would be to use Wierzbicka's universals to determine which metaphors are from image-schematic universals and which culture-specific preconditions... ---------------- Here is more about Wierzbicka's concepts, for those of you who are interested, from my notes: Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations By Anna Wierzbicka 1992, Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-507326-6 (pbk) Wierzbicka gives the following example of a set of dictionary definitions (`Concise Oxford', 1964): reprove = rebuke, chide rebuke = reprove, reprimand, censure authoritatively reprimand = officially rebuke censure = blame, crticise unfavourable, reprove criticise = discuss critically, censure Her argument is that you *can* write dictionary definitions that are meaningful to an adult foreigner, but that you have to use the universal concepts, and be careful. Concepts which she is confident are universal are (page 10): I, you, someone, something, this, say, want, don't want (or `no'), feel, think Likely also: know, where, good Others being investigated: when, can, like, the same, kind of, after, do, happen, bad, all, because, if, two Maybe also: part, become, imagine, world These fit in a sort of mini-grammar. Concepts are parts of grammatical categories: nominal: I, you, someone, something determiners: this, the same analogue of adjectives: good, bad analogue of verbs: think, say, want, know Using English grammatical order, the concepts fit into sentences like this: I think this I want this You do this This happened This person did something bad Here are three definitions of `soul', using only universal concepts: soul (definition 1, often contempory American) one of two parts of a person one cannot see it it is part of another world good beings are part of that world things are not part of that world because of this part a person can be a good person soul (definition 2, older as found in Hamlet) one of two parts of a person one cannot see it it is part of another world good beings are part of that world things are not part of that world other people can't know what things happen in that part of a person sometimes the person doesn't know what these things are these things can be good or bad because of this part a person can be a good person And here is yet another definition, base on usage that seems to make no reference to another world, as in `he believes in it to the very depths of his soul'. soul (definition 3, Wierzbicka calls this a `marginal definition') a part of a person one cannot see it other people can't know what things happen in that part sometimes the person doesn't know what these things are these things can be good or bad Then she talks about the quite different yet supposedly `equivalent' Russian, German, and French concepts of `soul', and also the concepts of `heart' and `mind'.