Date:  Fri, 23 Jan 1998 19:25:40 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <199801240025.TAA24519@locke.ccil.org>
Reply-To: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>
Sender: Lojban list <LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET>
From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>
Subject:      Re: Knowledge and belief
X-To:         lojban <lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu>
To: John Cowan <cowan@LOCKE.CCIL.ORG>
X-UIDL: 77620af4efd8719bff903511c90de514
Status: OR
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X-From-Space-Date: Mon Jan 26 12:41:14 1998
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Lojbab:
>If a person claiming to be a psychic says that they "know something"
>by means of their psychic powers, for people who do not believe in such
>powers, it is not sufficient that the knowledge be true and that the
>knower accept that truth.

Of course it is not sufficient, nobody said it was. It not only has to
be true, but the belief has to be _justified_. If you don't believe
in such things then you don't accept it as a justification for the
belief.

>Cowan's 4 point definition also fails
>>        A knows p iff:
>>>                1) A believes p;
>>>                2) p is true;
>>>                3) if p were false, then A wouldn't believe it;
>>>                4) if p were true, then A would believe it.
>
>because we cannot say that A would believe it if p were false, since p
>is true.

Why can't we say it? Let's say  that someone claims:

        The psychic knows that you have two children.

Let's say the psychic A just guessed right. In that case if p were false
then A would still believe it to be true, since the guess was independent
of the fact, so 3) doesn't hold and the psychic doesn't really know it.

co'o mi'e xorxes