Date: Tue, 13 Jan 1998 18:51:37 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199801132351.SAA11734@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" Sender: Lojban list From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" Subject: Re: knowledge and belief X-To: lojban To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 048b57789ff426dc6cf0df6c7bdbe56f X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 2237 X-From-Space-Date: Wed Jan 14 10:41:35 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - cu'u la ~mark >Um... what's the difference? If I'm saying something is true, isn't that >the same as saying that I believe that it's true (assuming I am not lying)? Truth conditionally they are different. Suppose John does not go to the market, but I believe that he does. Then: {la djan klama le zarci} is false, and {mi krici le du'u la djan klama le zarci} is true. I may claim either of the two. Later, when I learn the truth, I will still claim {mi pu krici le du'u la djan klama le zarci}, but not {la djan pu klama le zarci}. >So saying "Fred knows that Steve died" is saying (a) Fred believes that >Steve died, and (b) Steve really did die... or rather, *I* think so (I >could be wrong of course, but I don't think so). Well, it's not exactly the same. If you happen to find out that Steve didn't die, the two claims about belief remain true. The claim about knowledge doesn't, and neither does the bare claim that Steve really did die. >>- John knows that lojbab goes to the market. >>- na'i John can't know that because lojbab does not go to the market. > >Is the second sentence said by the same person or someone else? If the >latter, then he is correcting the first person's belief as well. Yes, he's correcting what she believed, but not the fact that she believed it. >>- John believes that lojbab goes to the market, and so do I. >>- You two may well believe it, but the truth is that he isn't going. > >Oh, I see. But when I say "John believes that lojbab goes to the market, >and so do I," then so far as I know, it's *true* (or I wouldn't be >believing it. I do not believe people knowingly believe falsehoods). Yes, that _is_ implied by the "know" claim. What I said is that the "know" claim entails more than that. >Isn't presupposition a belief? I'm not sure I see the difference. Your interlocutor will react differently. If you tell me "I believe that there is life in another galaxy", I will tell you that that's nice, but I don't believe either that there is or that there isn't life. You're still entitled to your beliefs. If you tell me "I know that there is life in another galaxy" I will be very skeptical. Your presupposition concerns my (your audience's) beliefs as well. co'o mi'e xorxes