Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 15:17:37 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199801222017.PAA23505@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: Rob Zook Sender: Lojban list From: Rob Zook Subject: Re: Knowledge and Belief X-To: LOJBAN@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan In-Reply-To: <199801212123.NAA01353@gateway.informix.com> X-UIDL: 3e4b729b5b60c88affb1330670c2cab0 X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 1442 X-From-Space-Date: Thu Jan 22 16:06:45 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - At 04:32 PM 1/21/98 -0500, John Cowan wrote: >Engdahl, Rod wrote: > >> On the other hand, when we say: >> >> "I (x1) know that (x2) > system>(x3) according to (x4)." >> >> that is a true statement. Once we give a context of a (even internally >> consistent) model, direct correspondence with reality is not necessarily >> required. > >Quite. *Sometimes* when we repudiate earlier truth claims, we have >acquired a new theory/epistemology/metaphysics/model/whatever. If I say mi djuno , then the unspecified x4 place would almost always be my current world view, or portion thereof applied to the current context. >That is fine, because then we are saying: > > x1 knows x2 by model S, and not-x2 is true by model T. > >which is no contradiction. *Most* of the time, though, when >we repudiate an earlier truth claim, we have *not* changed our >model, but simply adjusted our belief structure, and then >we say: > > If not-x2 is true by model S, then x1 not-knows x2 by model S. What difference do you see between model and belief structure in the context you just used? Rob Z. -------------------------------------------------------- Were it offered to my choice, I should have no objection to a repetition of the same life from its beginning, only asking the advantages authors have in a second edition to correct some faults in the first. -- Ben Franklin