X-Mozilla-Status: 0001 Message-ID: <34C51514.6139@locke.ccil.org> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 16:20:20 -0500 From: John Cowan Organization: Lojban Peripheral X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0 (WinNT; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Lojban List Subject: Re: Knowledge and belief References: <199801202101.QAA18996@locke.ccil.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-From-Space-Date: Tue Jan 20 16:20:20 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - Logical Language Group wrote: > > >No argument against that. You can claim djuno as long as you > >presuppose jetnu. If later you find out that jetnu doesn't hold, then > >you will withdraw the djuno claim as well. > > But this I think is wrong. if I claim djuno, and we agree that it is > true now, but then if it turns out that it is false (through presupposition > failure or some other reasoning) then at that time we can say that it is > false, but I do not see how we can make the former knowing "false". Ah, but you can *claim* something without its being true. For example, you can say "I have fatty degeneration of the liver", and it may turn out (after surgery or autopsy) that you do *not* have fatty etc. If you live to find this out, then you will withdraw your claim, and make a new claim: "I believed I had f.d.l., but I did not have f.d.l." This case, which does not involve knowledge, should be clear-cut. Similarly, if you don't know enough optics, you may say, "I know that red light has a wavelength of 440 nm", and George, being equally ignorant, may agree that this is true. But neither assertion nor agreement makes truth. When you are instructed otherwise, you will repudiate your earlier claim, saying "I did not (and do not) know that red light etc.", and George will say "You did not know etc." The "knowing" was not false (whatever that means), but the claim was incorrect. We must carefully distinguish between the *claim* made by an utterance, and the state of affairs that the statement *expresses*. (Some utterances, such as ".ui", express but do not claim.) Given that you are always sincere, then your utterance Bantha is a cat. claims that Bantha is a cat, and expresses your belief that Bantha is a cat. A fortiori, your utterance I believe that Bantha is a cat. claims that you believe etc., and expresses your belief *about your beliefs*. Similarly, I know that Bantha is a cat. claims that you know etc., and expresses your belief *about your state of knowledge*. If Bantha is a dog, than your claim is incorrect and you do not know that Bantha is a cat, but you may continue to believe Bantha to be a cat indefinitely. Your beliefs about your *beliefs* may be privileged (you and only you can say if they are wrong), but your beliefs about your states of knowledge are no more privileged than your beliefs about the wavelength of red light. My interpretations are false in a purely subjective (solipsistic?) metaphysics, in which every proposition is true iff you believe it is true, but surely that is not the default metaphysics for "djuno"! -- John Cowan http://www.ccil.org/~cowan cowan@ccil.org You tollerday donsk? N. You tolkatiff scowegian? Nn. You spigotty anglease? Nnn. You phonio saxo? Nnnn. Clear all so! 'Tis a Jute.... (FW 16.5)