Date: Mon, 5 Jan 1998 23:31:42 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199801060431.XAA12510@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: "Mark E. Shoulson" Sender: Lojban list From: "Mark E. Shoulson" Subject: Re: knowledge and belief X-To: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan In-Reply-To: <199801030627.BAA03259@cs.columbia.edu> (message from Steven Belknap on Sat, 3 Jan 1998 00:28:31 -0600) Status: OR X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 958 X-From-Space-Date: Mon Jan 5 23:31:43 1998 X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU >Date: Sat, 3 Jan 1998 00:28:31 -0600 >From: Steven Belknap > >>>At 1997-12-31 09:13, Steven Belknap wrote: >>> >>>>>>>kei fo da> >>>> >>>>"Steven knows that Jorge knows that Lojbab goes to the store." >>>> >>>>The above statement is always false, which considerably limits its utility. >>>>I am asserting that it is not possible to directly know that some else >>>>knows something. Just to muddy the waters further, how does this play with those indirect questions that have been making so many heads spin? What about "Steven knows that Jorge knows who went to the store"? You can't replace the second "knows" with "believes" or "opines", even in Lojban, can you? The first maybe. Does {mi krici ledu'u makau klama le zarci} make any sense in Lojban, as a "less certain" form of {mi djuno ledu'u makau klama le zarci} as the claim seems to be? ~mark