Date:  Fri, 2 Jan 1998 07:38:08 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <199801021238.HAA26975@locke.ccil.org>
Reply-To: Robin Turner <robin@BILKENT.EDU.TR>
Sender: Lojban list <LOJBAN@CUVMB.BITNET>
From: Robin Turner <robin@BILKENT.EDU.TR>
Subject:      Re: knowledge and belief
X-To:         lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu
To: John Cowan <cowan@LOCKE.CCIL.ORG>
Status: OR
X-Mozilla-Status: 0011
Content-Length:  986
X-From-Space-Date: Fri Jan  2 07:38:09 1998
X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU

>At 1997-12-31 09:13, Steven Belknap wrote:
>
>><la stivn djuno le du'u la xorxes djuno le du'u la lojbab klama le zarci
>>kei fo da>
>>
>>"Steven knows that Jorge knows that Lojbab goes to the store."
>>
>>The above statement is always false, which considerably limits its utility.
>>I am asserting that it is not possible to directly know that some else
>>knows something.
>
I'm not sure about the Lojban, but the English is NOT always false.  Let's
say Steven saw Lojbab go to the store.  At the same time, he noticed Jorge
watching Lojbab going to the store.  Unless Steven was hallucinating or
Jorge suffered temporarily blindness, Steven knows that Jorge knows that
Lojbab went to the store, not just that Jorge _said_ he knows.  The type of
qualifications mentioned (hallucination etc.) apply to almost any
predication, not just to those with "know".  I would not normally say
"Assuming I have not hallucinated my entire life, my name is Robin."

co'o mi'e robin.  (... I think)