Date: Fri, 2 Jan 1998 18:38:44 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199801022338.SAA16030@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: mark.vines@wholefoods.com Sender: Lojban list From: Mark Vines Subject: Re: Knowledge and Belief X-To: LOJBAN@CUVMB.COLUMBIA.EDU To: John Cowan In-Reply-To: Rob Zook "Re: Knowledge and Belief" (Jan 2, 4:14pm) Status: OR X-Mozilla-Status: 0011 Content-Length: 2076 X-From-Space-Date: Fri Jan 2 18:38:46 1998 X-From-Space-Address: LOJBAN@CUVMB.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU la rab. spuda mi di'e > > in my scenario, I *saw* the catcher > > catching the pitch, so I feel justified in saying > > that the catcher *knows* that the pitch happened. > > But you speculate beyond any possible evidence, since > you cannot tell what goes inside the catcher's mind. mi spuda la rab. di'e My evidence is that the catcher caught the pitch. Also, the schema of the baseball diamond implies that the catcher was facing the mound, so s/he had the opportunity to observe the pitch. Thus I cannot agree that I am speculating "beyond any possible evidence". The evidence may be incomplete, but it does tend to support my claim. > > Steven would have us believe that knowledge is such a > > purely internal state that only the catcher hi/rself > > can say anything about what the catcher knows. > > I would have to agree with that. I don't. I agree with la lojbab. to the effect that one can use + deduction from actions, empathy, etc. These are all + valid as epistemologies for some people for some kinds + of knolwedge. You cannot consider the meaning of djuno + without that epistemology place, nor [can] you limit + its meaning to only the most "logical" of epistemologies. My statement about the catcher's knowledge was based on an inference regarding hi/r action (catching the pitch). > One cannot directly observe someone elses knowledge > without that other's help - via them saying what they > know. Or via their behavior. Or whatever. > You could perhaps build a logical argument to justify > you know what someone else knows, but in this case you > provide none in your statement. > > I would guess one uses the "epistemology x4" place for > a logical justification. I agree with you there, but I can't resist pointing out that Lojban grammar allows us to leave sumti unspecified when the speaker considers them either irrelevant or pragmatically obvious. I also agree with you that the rarity of absolute knowing would make a gismu like {djuno} practically pointless, if its meaning were limited to absolute knowledge. co'omi'e markl.