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Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 16:32:14 -0500
From: John Cowan <cowan@locke.ccil.org>
Organization: Lojban Peripheral
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To: Lojban List <lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu>
Subject: Re: Knowledge and Belief
References: <199801212126.QAA09770@locke.ccil.org>
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Engdahl, Rod wrote:
 
> On the other hand, when we say:
> 
> "I (x1) know that <the Earth is the center> (x2) <of the solar
> system>(x3) according to <Ptolemaic theory> (x4)."
> 
> that is a true statement.  Once we give a context of a (even internally
> consistent) model, direct correspondence with reality is not necessarily
> required.

Quite.  *Sometimes* when we repudiate earlier truth claims, we have
acquired a new theory/epistemology/metaphysics/model/whatever.
That is fine, because then we are saying:

	x1 knows x2 by model S, and not-x2 is true by model T.

which is no contradiction.  *Most* of the time, though, when
we repudiate an earlier truth claim, we have *not* changed our
model, but simply adjusted our belief structure, and then
we say:

	If not-x2 is true by model S, then x1 not-knows x2 by model S.

-- 
John Cowan	http://www.ccil.org/~cowan		cowan@ccil.org
	You tollerday donsk?  N.  You tolkatiff scowegian?  Nn.
	You spigotty anglease?  Nnn.  You phonio saxo?  Nnnn.
		Clear all so!  'Tis a Jute.... (FW 16.5)