Date: Fri, 20 Feb 1998 11:23:42 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802201623.LAA01149@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: And Rosta Sender: Lojban list From: And Rosta Organization: University of Central Lancashire Subject: Re: Summary so far on DJUNO X-To: Logical Language Group X-cc: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: d1e4379559649569c8d228dadfbaa34b X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Fri Feb 20 11:18:32 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - Lojbab: > >> >> (there > >> >> being no place for the speaker in the (default - non BAId) place structur > >> > > >> >Agreed. The same goes for all the gismu. Noone has proposed that > >> >{djuno} needs a place for the speaker. In fact, even if the speaker > >> >were a participant in the gismu meaning it would be pointless to > >> >have a sumti place for the speaker, because the speaker is > >> >identifiable from the context. > >> > >> Not always. > > > >Well if you seriously consider that a problem, it would be soluble by > >whatever means would be used to identify the referent/denotation of > >{mi}. > > only if "mi" is used in the bridi. There's always {mi`e}. > In "la djan. djuno X" there is no need to resolve "mi", nor to know who > the speaker is, to understand the claim. Therefore the truth-belief of > the speaker should be irrelevant to the truth of "la djan djuno X". I agree. I have been saying this all along. Indeed, it's exactly what I say in the quoted stuff you were replying to. It is only you who somehow thinks that the true-x2 version of djuno somehow peculiarily requires a place for the speaker. > >> In any event, I do not thonk that the truth of a djuno > >> proposition should depend on the speaker. > > > >By "djuno proposition" do you mean the x2, or the proposition > >containing "djuno"? > > The latter > > >If the latter: > >The truth of a djuno proposition depends on the speaker in exactly > >the same way that any other proposition depends on the speaker. - > > ta mlatu > > or maybe better > > ko'a mlatu (assuming that ko'a has been prespecified) > > has a truth value independent of the speaker. Or if it does not, then there > should be a BAI or context that explicitly places the speaker into the > bridi. In the absence of any such mention, I would not feel a need to > know who the speaker was to evaluate the truth of the claim. I want the > same to be true of djuno. I absolutely utterly utterly 100% agree. So does Jorge. So we are all in complete unanimity on this. So what we disagree on is on whether ko`a jetyju`o ko`e [where jetyju`o = true-x2 version of djuno] has a truth-value that is as independent of the speaker as {ta mlatu}. > >> It is at least as jsutifiable that > >> the truth of adjuno proposition should depend on the listener/reader. > > > >(a) Explain what you mean. (b) Prove it is as justifiable. > > It is justifiable in that we have prescribed that Lojban pragmatics are weighted to require that a speaker be clear according to the terms of the listener. > I would interpret this among other things as requiring thatone abide by the > definitions and judgements of ones audience in the event of possible confusion. > > But that is not what I "meant". I was trying to say that a listener, not > knowing who the speaker was (say he sees this djuno statement written as > graffiti on a wall) will interpret the statement based on HIS interpretation > of djuno and the truth of x2. IN certain media, statements can be separated > from their original speakers, and the only possible standard of jusgement > is that of the reader/listener. OK. But since I remain unpersuaded that the speaker is any more implicated in a djuno proposition than in any other proposition, I conclude that what you say is, though reasonable, irrelevant. > But I also realize that in such media, the speaker cannot know who his readers > will be, and it makes a lot better sense for the standard of djuno to be > le djuno. What "standard of djuno" do you mean? > >> They may be observer based > >> in which case epistemology is the x2 and jetnu becomes akin to djuno. > > > >Who would the observer be? > > Well to take the obvious example, certain statements involving relativity > theory give different truths depending on the observer. OK. So if there are multiple realities each accessible only by a different observer, and the observer actually cognizes the reality, then what you'd need is x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3 by observer-dependent metaphysics x5 with epistemology x4 You might then define {djuno} as: x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent metaphysics, with epistemology x4 Now my question would be this: if x1 is in error - if x1 thinks that x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent metaphysics, with epistemology x4, but x1 is in fact mistaken and x2 is, by the metaphysics, not true, *would this count as djuno*? If you say No, then I think we are converging on agreement. If you say Yes, then we're not. Oh shit. Maybe there's no hope of convergence after all. I have just reread what you said, and your example is supposed to be one of different *epistemologies*, not metaphysicses, which is how I took it. I'm still not clear on what {jetnu} means with an epistemology x2. > >> They may be based on some fuzzy definition, in which case some minimum level > >f fuzzy truth may > >> be required to call a statement jetnu, and that standard would then go in x2 > > > >This is too vague for me to understand it. > > Using what I understand as Belknap's version of fuzzy truth, the truth > value of "George is bald" might be some thing other than binary 0 or 1. > If the truth value is .9 on a scale of 0/1, si it "true" for purposes of > evaluating "djuno"? How about .8? etc. If things are based on le djuno's > perception of truth, whatever that may be, then I don't necessarily need to > know about fuzzy truth considerations. If I have to deal with 5 different > speakers making contradictory claims about whether le djuno cu djuno, and > each speaker uses a different criterion (fuzzy level) to decide whether > le se djuno is true, then I cannot interpret the statements without going into > the fuzzy conceptions of each of those 5 speakers. I understand your example. There remain two things I don't understand. 1. Why are three distinct notions conflated into the x2 of jetnu? They should have been separated out. As it stands, if "ko`a jetnu ko`e", you don't know whether ko`e is a metaphysics, a standard, or an epistemology. Okay, that works, but it seems a bit weird to have a common or garden *gismu*, rather than an abstruse philosopher's jargon lujvo, meaning "x2 is either a metaphysics, a standard or an epistemology for the truth of x1"! 2. Why does {jetnu} have a standard-or-metaphysics place and {mlatu} not? It seems to me (at least at the moment, but mi jinvi gi`e na birti) that {mlatu} has an equally good claim to such a place. --And.