Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 20:04:25 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802200104.UAA03580@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" Sender: Lojban list From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" Subject: Re: Summary of summaries on DJUNO X-To: lojban To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 58167513abbac00e4633ddf848d9171c X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Thu Feb 19 19:57:51 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - Lojbab: > If John is >using a metaphysics that i accept and you do not (and presumably he accepts >it), you would seem to be saying that, to me, John knows X, and to you >John cannot know X. But djuno does not include a metaphysics place so we >have no way of knowing other than by implication from the epistemology. >But as to John's knowing, who decides? I was thinking that Jorge was arguing >that the speaker decides based on his presumption of truth, but am not sure >that Jorge still feels this way based on recent responses. I never felt that way, much less "still". Consider these two statements: (1) ta mlatu (2) la djan djuno le du'u ta mlatu Who decides about the truth of (1)? Certainly not the cat, nor the cat's species, so is (1) missing a place for the metaphysics? Now, whichever metaphysics you use to evaluate the truth of (1) you can use to evaluate the truth of (2). As simple as that. The truth value of {le du'u ta mlatu} in (2) will be the same as the truth value of (1). The truth value of (2) does not depend on the speaker any more than the truth value of (1) does. >The bottom line is that I recognize that "truth" is not universally agreed >upon, and I want a definition of "djuno" that people can understand without >necessarily agreeing on whether le se djuno is true. Of course the definition of "djuno" can be understood without agreeing that any particular se djuno is true. Both definitions in contention are perfectly understandable. >>Even if you had your way and {djuno} were defined as you would wish, >>the definition that others are adovcating for {djuno} could be >>assigned to some other brivla with exactly the same place structure. >>Remember that. > >No - they need a metaphysics place tied to the x2 instead of or in addition to >the x4 place that you have agreed is tied mnore strongly to x1 (recognizing >that some epistemologies imply certain metaphysics and vice versa). Then you need such a place for every single gismu. co'o mi'e xorxes