Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 18:55:33 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802262355.SAA24639@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: Carl Burke Sender: Lojban list From: Carl Burke Subject: Re: zo djuno ce zo jetyju'o X-To: LOJBAN@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: c747e8e0d223ef2971bafab15de8a61c Status: O X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Mon Mar 02 13:31:08 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - At 05:59 PM 2/24/98 GMT+0, you wrote: ... >> Perhaps it would help if you could repost this so-called "clearly >> articulated" view of djuno? I remember no such animal. > >Presumably you have just been skimming the thread, which is what I >often do when I'm not actively participating. Same as I'm doing... >The view I was referring to is that the meaning is: > > x2 is true about x3 and epistemology x4 convinces x1 that x2 is true > about x3 So long as the 'standard' x4, when elided, is the experience of the individual being credited with 'knowing' x2 about x3. In that case I can buy this definition. Where we tend to run into trouble (IMHO) is when we assume that all the cognitive models of all the people involved are going to agree, or if we assume that x2 is an absolute objectively true fact about x3; neither of those assumptions can safely be assumed to hold in general. (If it seems like I'm spouting bullshit here, just ignore me; I've been reading Lakoff lately, so that viewpoint is still sinking in.) -- Carl Burke cburke@mitre.org