Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 12:08:11 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802251708.MAA16553@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: "Erik W. Cornilsen" Sender: Lojban list From: "Erik W. Cornilsen" Subject: Truth-ambiguous djuno [was Re: Summary so far on DJUNO] X-To: Lojban List To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 4846210398a6c688fbc323b3c4e50c41 X-Mozilla-Status: 8001 X-From-Space-Date: Wed Feb 25 11:58:37 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - From: Chris Bogart >la erik ba'o cusku di'e >>I'm sorry if this muddies the waters further, but what would djuno mean >>if any requirement of truth of the predication was divorced from x2? >...Interesting; if you elide x4, we'd assume "the obvious epistemology", >which in most contexts would probably be both the speaker's AND x1's >epistemology, making x2 effectively true for purposes of conversation. The obvious epistemology would usually be "belief," as people aren't noted for using rigorous proofs in everyday life. :) Or, in more concrete matters, observation. Neither of which are entirely reliable for creating true statements. >If Doug is a Buddhist studying Christian philosophy for purely academic >reasons, his teacher might say {la dag. djuno lenu la xriso cu di'a jmive} >(Doug "djuno" that christ was resurrected), meaning that he understands that >point of philosophy without necessarily believing it. But outside of that >special context, one would probably assume Doug was a Christian. I wouldn't go quite that far. That would also be assuming that Doug "believed" in the truthfulness of the statement. If we remove all supposition of truth from "djuno," then we are neither saying that the speaker or the x1 believes in the truthfulness of the x2, nor that anyone believes the epistemology x4 produces true results. The only flawless epistemology would be omniscience. Beyond that we are restricted to believing in, dis-believing in, or withholding judgment on the truth of any statement produced by an admittedly flawed epistemology. With truth being a much stickier subject than knowledge, removing any trace of it from "djuno" allows one to speak of knowledge without being bogged-down by truth. Here's the scenario that produced this line of thought, for those interested: Supposing that djuno could only be used if both the speaker and the x1 believed x2 to be true. If they both believed in the truth of x2, then the speaker could use djuno. If the x1 believed but the speaker did not, this would indicate that they were not using the same epistemology. Perhaps the x1 was using an epistemology the speaker considered to be flawed, i.e., not producing true statements, for the particular subject, and the speaker could not use djuno. Having recognized that the x1 is using an epistemology which x1 believes to be producing true results, but which is actually in error, the speaker must then doubt their own epistemology by which they judged the x2 to be false. It is directly observed that not all epistemologies which are believed to be producing true results by their users actually do produce true results. The speaker now can neither unreservedly agree nor disagree with the x1 on the truthfulness of x2, unless to claim that their own personal epistemology is infallible on the subject. If the speaker cannot agree, then per the initial supposition, they cannot use djuno. Furthermore, the speaker can now not claim that anything they djuno is absolutely true either, having recognized the fallibility of epistemologies other than omniscience, and cannot use "mi djuno" either. Thus, supposing that both the speaker and the x1 agree to the truth of x2 results in no one ever being able to use djuno. :) Removing the restriction that the speaker and the x1 agree to the truth of the x2 allows the speaker to use "mi djuno" without regard for the believed truth of x2, given the fallibility of epistemologies shown above. :) :) So, Doug can djuno statements about some subject by some epistemology, but no degree of truth or belief is ever implied at any point. That's just how I was thinking of a truth-less djuno. :) It even allows one to djuno things by some epistemology one is not decided on the truthfulness of. Anyway, enough rambling. Just something to think about. :) -- Erik W. Cornilsen thanatos@dimensional.com