Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 09:58:13 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802231458.JAA28935@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: And Rosta Sender: Lojban list From: And Rosta Organization: University of Central Lancashire Subject: Re: Summary of summaries on DJUNO X-To: Logical Language Group X-cc: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: d51d7bdbfa74582576d2d8e4eecdb7d9 X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Mon Feb 23 11:59:29 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - > >They might arguably be better with a metaphysics place (in addition > >to the x4), but they don't have to have one. The meaning of a > >predicate never dictates obligatorily the place structure. So, for > >example, you can take any gismu and define another brivla with one or > >more fewer sumti than the gismu as synonymous with the gismu. > > But then you are saying that the omitted place is not necessarily relevant > or even required for the meaning. No: you're not; you are mistaken. You cannot logically reason from the meaning to the syntactic place-structure. But you can reason from meaning to place-structure on grounds of utility: it is desirable that certain semantic arguments be expressible by a syntactic sumti place. > >As for whether a brivla whose sense involves notions of "truth" is > >necessarily better off with a metaphysics place, I'm not sure that it > >is. I cannot see any difference between > > > > x1 is true by metaphysics x2 > > > >and > > > > x1 is a cat by metaphysics x2 > > > >- either I'm not thinking straight, or it is the case that every > >predicate has an equal claim to a metaphysics place. > > If x1 is an abstraction (which du'u is) then there are two possible levels > in which to insert a metaphsyics place > > (x1 is a cat by metaphysics x2) is true by metaphsyics t2 > > It would seem possible (not sure if plausible) to use a different > metaphysics for jetnu "is true" in some contexts, than one would use for > "is a cat". How so? A qualitatively different metaphysics? (i.e. one different in kind?) > If it is NOT possible/plausible then this seems to be a unique property of > truth/falsity claims, Do you mean that "NOT"? > or perhaps one is being constrained to apply > only one kind of metaphysics in any context. I am nowhere near the > kind of philosopher to know if this is done (and it may depend on what one > considers to be a metaphysics). But it is this dual level that is the basis > for my arguing acgainst the dependent claim that "x2 is jetnu/fatci" in > djuno as being implicit. You really need to be clearer about the nature of this dual level if you're going to base an argument on it. I can't follow your reasoning yet. > IT seems to me that the very acknowledging that > there exist many metaphysics, renders the possibility that I would apply > a different metaphysical standard to the truth fo x2 than to the truth of the > djuno claim that involves that x2. This may be so, but I cannot see why the same does not apply to any bridi containing multiple bridi. Are you, for example, actually denying that {jetyju`o} (on Don's definition) could be a possible brivla? You seem to be attempting to direct a philosophical attack on the jetyju`o meaning for {djuno}, but we should distinguish between an argument that the jetyju`o meaning is inherently flawed, and an argument that the jetyju`o meaning is inappropriate for {djuno} (as opposed to some lujvo or other). The former argument, which seems to be the one you are trying to make, is far more general in its application than {djuno}. The latter argument pertains only to {djuno}, but I am still waiting for it to be made coherently (though hopefully I will this afternoon have time to do so myself in an attempt to bring the thread to a satisfactory conclusion). --And.