Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 23:08:22 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802190408.XAA19198@locke.ccil.org> Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 22:47:44 -0300 Reply-To: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" Sender: Lojban list From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Jorge_J._Llamb=EDas?=" Subject: Re: Summary so far on DJUNO X-To: lojban To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 84efb85f74bde818da0947c60fc3a980 X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Thu Feb 19 12:23:22 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - Lojbab: >You have argued that (as I understand it) Lojban djuno means the same >thing as English "know" which you claim entails such a presupposition. Right. >But if you have a presupposition, then you have a presupposer. Who is that >presupposer? The speaker, the listener, the guy who discovers a 10th planet >a hundred years from now? The speaker. >I contend that the only presupposer who matters >in djuno is le djuno. I understand that. >I think the same argument probably applies to English >"know" but I am trying not to argue about English "know" except that it seems >to keep on getting dragged back in by the fact that you want to define djuno >based on it (or at least interpret my definition in the gismu list based on it). You think that it applies to English "know" but you can't explain why sentences that violate the speaker's presupposition fail. The reason that I want to interpret the definition in the gismu list based on it is that the definition is: x1 knows x2 about x3 by epist. x4. >I am reasonable certain that I have now pinpointed that your requirement that >x2 be ture requires an extra place not part of djuno, being the metaphysics >that is used to determine that x2 is true, which And has agreed with me is >distinct from the x4 epistemology which convinces x1 that x2 is true. He >has noted that you have not conceded this, though. Ok, we can debate that. First you would need to justify the need for a metaphysics place for jetnu in the first place. Why for jetnu and not for blanu, mlatu, klama, etc, etc. In other words, what is the difference between these sentences: 1- la djan cu xusra le du'u ti mlatu John asserts that this is a cat. 2- la djan cu xusra le du'u le du'u ta mlat cu fatci John asserts that it is a fact that this is a cat. 3- la djan cu xusra le du'u le du'u ta mlatu cu jetnu ko'a John asserts that by metaphysics koha it is true that this is a cat. Is (1) closer to (2) or to (3)? From your comments about fatci I suppose you'd say it is closer to (3). How come then that in (1) there is no place for the metaphysics koha? Shouldn't xusra have a place for the metaphysics for which the x1 asserts that x2 is true? co'o mi'e xorxes