Date: Fri, 27 Feb 1998 13:52:35 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802271852.NAA05448@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: And Rosta Sender: Lojban list From: And Rosta Organization: University of Central Lancashire Subject: Re: Summary so far on DJUNO X-To: LOJBAN@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: cf3145cbc9466c9b4e803b095e8842c7 Status: O X-Mozilla-Status: 8013 X-From-Space-Date: Mon Mar 02 13:38:52 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - Don: > la .and > >> For any expression f by a is true only if the metaphysics M used by a > evaluates > >> to true. That is any expression is f is a function of M and M is a function > of > >> a: f (M (a)). > > >Are you using normal syntax here? I have tried but failed to parse & > >understand it. > > K. > > f is an utterance (e.g. 'ti mlatu') > a is the expressor of the utterance ('mi') > M is a metaphysics that is used to evaluate the truth of the expression (a's > brain) > > To evaluate if f is true, we need the metaphysics under which the utterance is > made that is f is a function of M. Again, the metaphysics is dependent upon > the who expressed the utterance that is M is a function of a. > > Giving, f (M (a)). I understand. It's not quite right, though, is it? We're concerned with propositions rather than utterances, and not every proposition is an (independent) utterance. Yet all propositions have some kind of truth-value. > >> > ge ko`e mlatu gi ko`a djuno le du`u ko`e mlatu > >> This is false. > >It cannot be false. It is true *by definition*. > >> Only 'djuno' is evaluated using the expressor metaphysics M (a). > >> The 'du'u' subexpression does not need to be evaluated to determine if the > >> knowee knows it, there must be only an epistemology to say how it is known. > >I am not sure what you are talking about. {Djuno} as defined in the > >quote above, or as defined by some other definition? I suppose you > >don't mean the former, since what you say is obviously incompatible > >with it. > > 'djuno' as defined in the gi'uste, i.e. without a place for the metaphysics of > x2 (returning to the point that something is true only by having a metaphysics > under which to evaluate it). This appears to be where Jorge and I on the one hand are opposed to you and Lojbab on the other. J & I contend that the gi`uste is equally compatible with true-x2 and lite-x2 definitions (though it is compatible with lite-x2 only if djuno does not actually mean "x1 knows x2 about x3 by epist x4", of course, but rather "x1 believes x2 about x3 by epist x4"). The J-& case is threefold. Firstly, the mere *absence* of a syntactic sumti place does not in the least constrain meaning. Secondly, it would seem by your argument that even lite-x2 djuno should have an x5 for the metaphysics by which x2 is, in x1's belief, true. Thirdly, on the true-x2 version, there is no need for a metaphysics x5, because the metaphysics is the same as for the whole djuno proposition. > > According to the true-x2 version of {djuno}, {djuno ko`e} would be > > true by metaphysics M only ko`e is true by metaphysics M. > > > > Actually, I'd better spell it out more fully and accurately: > > > >true-x2 version of {djuno} [current version]: > > 1. epistemology x4 convinces x1 that P > > P: x2 is true about x3 by a certain metaphysics > >AND 2. P > > The crux. The baseline does not imply clause (2). It "implies" it, by using "know"; that much has been agreed. But we have also agreed that the actual wording of the gi`uste is non-defining. So, taking that into account, the gi`uste implies neither true-x2 nor lite-x2. There are various factors that influence our choice between true-x2 and lite-x2, and I am somewhat agnostic about which is preferable. > > Clauses (1) and (2) are true by the same metaphysics, though this is > > not necessarily the one you are calling M(a), which I take to be the > > one obtaining at the level of the illocutinary act. > > Clause (1) is true under the metaphysics of the expressor, M (a). And what about when Clause (1) (in conjunction with (2)) is embeded in a larger proposition? What's the metaphysics then? > There is no > other metaphysics M' under which to evaluate (2). That is why it is necessary > to introduce 'jetnu' for this purpose. You seem to be implying that this is a refutation of what I said. But if it is, I can't see how. You say "There is no other metaphysics M' under which to evaluate (2)", but why does that matter, since I said that clause (2) is evaluated by the same metaphysics as (1), namely "M(a)"? > With your scheme, does not it become impossible to say that someone else knows > something that you disagree with: > .i la bil. djuno ledu'u la santas. claus. klama kei folenu te cusku > Bill knows Santa Claus is coming by the epistemology that someone told him so. Quite so. Well... - I assume you are speaking loosely, for of course it would still be possible to say that sentence, but it would be believed by the speaker to be untrue. (I say this because some people tend to take these "impossible to say" locutions literally, rather than a convenient metaphor.) > This would be evaluate to true under the baseline, Only if the baseline includes the contents of Lojbab's head as well as what's there in black and white. --And.