Date: Fri, 20 Feb 1998 14:25:49 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802201925.OAA07394@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: Logical Language Group Sender: Lojban list From: Logical Language Group Subject: Re: Summary of summaries on DJUNO X-To: a.rosta@uclan.ac.uk X-cc: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 3e1394e9b6d967c66cd5fb90bc193c3c X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Fri Feb 20 17:00:16 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - >They might arguably be better with a metaphysics place (in addition >to the x4), but they don't have to have one. The meaning of a >predicate never dictates obligatorily the place structure. So, for >example, you can take any gismu and define another brivla with one or >more fewer sumti than the gismu as synonymous with the gismu. But then you are saying that the omitted place is not necessarily relevant or even required for the meaning. >As for whether a brivla whose sense involves notions of "truth" is >necessarily better off with a metaphysics place, I'm not sure that it >--More-- >is. I cannot see any difference between > > x1 is true by metaphysics x2 > >and > > x1 is a cat by metaphysics x2 > >- either I'm not thinking straight, or it is the case that every >predicate has an equal claim to a metaphysics place. If x1 is an abstraction (which du'u is) then there are two possible levels in which to insert a metaphsyics place (x1 is a cat by metaphysics x2) is true by metaphsyics t2 It would seem possible (not sure if plausible) to use a different metaphysics for jetnu "is true" in some contexts, than one would use for "is a cat". If it is NOT possible/plausible then this seems to be a unique property of truth/falsity claims, or perhaps one is being constrained to apply only one kind of metaphysics in any context. I am nowhere near the kind of philosopher to know if this is done (and it may depend on what one considers to be a metaphysics). But it is this dual level that is the basis for my arguing acgainst the dependent claim that "x2 is jetnu/fatci" in djuno as being implicit. IT seems to me that the very acknowledging that there exist many metaphysics, renders the possibility that I would apply a different metaphysical standard to the truth fo x2 than to the truth of the djuno claim that involves that x2. The internals of the x2, however, shgould not normally be considered part of the implicit (as opposed to pragmatic) meaning of djuno. lojbab